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INTRODUCTION
For many years, two landscapes on Alaska’s North Slope have
remained mostly intact, serving as essential habitats for Arctic plants,
animals, and people.1 One of these landscapes is the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). The size of South Carolina, it is the largest of
the national system of refuges managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
1. GEORGE M. DURNER ET AL., U.S. GEO. SERVS. DATA SERIES 568,
CATALOGUE OF POLAR BEAR (URSUS MARITIMUS) MATERNAL DEN LOCATIONS IN
THE BEAUFORT SEA AND NEIGHBORING REGIONS, ALASKA, 1910–2010 (2010)
(stating Coastal Plain is one of the most important land-denning areas for polar
bears in the United States); Stephen Brown et al., Shorebird Abundance and
Distribution on the Coastal Plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 109
CONDOR: ORNITHOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1 (2007) (mentioning important
habitat for imperiled birds); DON RUSSELL & ANNE GUNN, VULNERABILITY
ANALYSIS OF THE PORCUPINE CARIBOU HERD TO POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF
THE 1002 LANDS IN THE ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE, ALASKA (2019)
(this report was prepared for Environment Yukon, Canadian Wildlife Service and
GNWT Department of Environment and Natural Resources); RICHARD J.
WILSON, A MORAL CHOICE FOR THE UNITED STATES, THE HUMAN RIGHTS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GWICH’IN OF DRILLING IN THE ARCTIC NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGE (2005), http://ourarcticrefuge.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/
10/GSChumanrightsreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8EM-YUBU] (describing the
importance of the area for the Porcupine Caribou Herd and the Gwich’in People);
Brad A. Andres et al., Shorebirds Breeding in Unusually High Densities in the
Teshekpuk Lake Special Area, Alaska; 65 ARCTIC 411 (2012); Jonathan Bart et
al., Importance of the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska for Aquatic Birds, 27
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1304 (2013).
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Service.2 Its biologically abundant Coastal Plain along the Beaufort Sea is
about the size of Delaware.3 While large portions of ANWR outside of the
Coastal Plain are designated as Wilderness,4 where development is
prohibited,5 the Coastal Plain has a different status. The 1980 Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA)6 permitted a single
round of exploration that was completed in the 1980s. Until recently,
pursuant to ANILCA Sections 1002 and 1003, additional drilling was
prohibited on the Coastal Plain.7
West of ANWR, past the lands held by the State of Alaska, lies another
important unit of federal lands—the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska
(NPRA). NPRA extends southward from its Coastal Plain along the
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas toward the Brooks Range, covering an area
about the size of the State of Indiana.8 President Harding set aside the area
in 1923, recognizing its potential for oil development.9 The U.S. Navy and
its contractor drilled 136 test holes in this area before Congress transferred
2. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE
REVISED COMPREHENSIVE CONSERVATION PLAN, VOL. 1-1 (2015).
3. The 2,000-Acre Footprint Myth, AUDUBON, http://ak.audubon.org/news/
2000-acre-footprint-myth [https://perma.cc/6NCA-6DEC] (last visited Sept. 10,
2019).
4. Alaska National Investment Land Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L No.
96-487, § 702, 94 Stat. 2371; 43 U.S.C. § 1618.
5. Wilderness Act of 1964, ch. 23, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136); Alaska National Investment Land Conservation Act of
1980, Pub. L No. 96-487, § 1003, 94 Stat. 2371; see, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 3143 (2016).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 3143 (2016).
7. See 16 U.S.C. § 3142(i) (2016) (“Until otherwise provided for in law
enacted after December 2, 1980, all public lands within the Coastal Plain are
withdrawn from all forms of entry or appropriation under the mining laws, and
from operation of the mineral leasing laws, of the United States.”); see also 16
U.S.C. § 3143 (2016) (“Production of oil and gas from the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge is prohibited and no leasing or other development leading to
production of oil and gas from the range shall be undertaken until authorized by
an Act of Congress.”). As discussed infra, Congress revised ANILCA in 2017 to
allow leasing of the Coastal Plain.
8. GEORGE GRYC, THE NATIONAL PETROLEUM RESERVE IN ALASKA
EARTH-SCIENCE CONSIDERATIONS U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY PROFESSIONAL
PAPER 1240-C, C6 (1985), https://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/1240c/report.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/HL4C-6EB9].
9. Frequently Asked Questions of the Integrated Activity Plan/Environmental
Impact Statement, BUREAU LAND MGMT., https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-off
ice/eplanning/planAndProjectSite.do?methodName=dispatchToPatternPage&curr
entPageId=14709 [https://perma.cc/CAR2-FSFW] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019)
(citing and discussing the history and purpose of Executive Order 3797 of 1923).
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jurisdiction of this land to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in
1976.10
The 1968 discovery of oil at Prudhoe Bay, situated on state lands
between NPRA and ANWR,11 started an intense period of development on
state lands12 that peaked in 1988.13 Oil exploration and production on
NPRA has been much more limited by comparison, with relatively few
lease tracts receiving bids during annual sales.14
Two processes, both initiated by a 2018 Interior Secretary Order,15 are
expected to open up biologically important coastal areas of NPRA and
ANWR for development. One of these processes is BLM’s discontinuing
the 2012 Integrated Activity Plan,16 governing where and how
development takes place in NPRA.17 The 2012 plan struck a balance

10. Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act, Pub. L. 94-258, 90 Stat. 303,
(Apr. 5, 1976).
11. March 13, 1968: Oil Discovered on Alaska's North Slope, U.S. DEP’T
ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/management/march-13-1968-oil-discoveredalaskas-north-slope [https://perma.cc/875N-D9V4] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
12. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-02-357, ALASKA’S
NORTH SLOPE, REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTORING LANDS AFTER OIL PRODUCTION
CEASES 3 (2002); Elwood Brehmer, NPR-A Sale Draws Limited Interest, but One
New Company, ALASKA J. COMM. (Dec. 12, 2018), http://www.alaskajournal.com
/2018-12-12/npr-sale-draws-limited-interest-one-new-company#.XG7eJehKjZs
[https://perma.cc/NH25-XDNY] (limited lease sale bids on federal compared to
nearby state lands).
13. ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE & TAXATION, PRODUCTION HISTORY AND
FORECAST BY PRODUCTION AREA FROM FALL 2017 RSB (2017), http://www.tax
.alaska.gov/sourcesbook/AlaskaProduction.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDF5-E9DC].
14. Alaska Oil and Gas Lease Sales, BUREAU LAND MGMT., https://www
.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/leasing/regional-lease-sales
/alaska [https://perma.cc/Q3SJ-XQYX] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019); Yereth Rosen,
Alaskan Oil Lease Sale Brings Few Bids Despite Vast Territory Offered, REUTERS
(Dec. 6, 2017, 8:49 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-alaska-oil/alask
an-oil-lease-sale-brings-few-bids-despite-vast-territory-offered-idUSKBN1E109Q
[https://perma.cc/969X-4D8D].
15. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3352, National Petroleum
Reserve-Alaska (May 31, 2017).
16. Bureau of Land Management, National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska Final
Integrated Activity Plan/Environmental Impact Statement (2012) [hereinafter
NPRA EIS/IAP 2012].
17. BLM Notice of Intent to Prepare the NPRA IAP/EIS 83 Fed. Reg. 58785,
58785 (Nov. 20, 2018) [hereinafter BLM, Notice of Intent]; see also Dep’t of the
Interior Secretarial Order No. 3360, Rescinding Authorities Inconsistent with
Secretary's Order 3349, “American Energy Independence” (calling for
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between development and conservation, leaving the most biologically
important areas of land (“Special Areas”) off limits to development. But
many of the tracts with the greatest potential for development are included
in the Teshekpuk Lake Special Area.18 A new plan, if completed under the
Trump Administration, will likely open additional areas for leasing, shrink
the special area boundaries, and change the stipulations associated with
leases.19
The second process, initiated by the Oil and Gas Program Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act of 2017, involves opening ANWR to oil and gas lease sales.
The 2017 Act required BLM to “establish and administer a competitive oil
and gas program for the leasing, development, production, and
transportation of oil and gas in and from the Coastal Plain,” with
management similar to lease sales for NPRA.20
Oil and gas development on the North Slope has significantly declined
since its peak in the 1980s,21 and many in Alaska and elsewhere are hailing
the prospect of increasing future production.22 Yet agencies with
reconsideration of BLM’s Draft Regional Mitigation Strategy for the
Northeastern National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska (Sept. 2016)).
18. BUREAU LAND MGMT., NATIONAL PETROLEUM RESERVE IN ALASKA,
2018 SALE RESULTS (2018), https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/uploads/Oil
andGas_Alaska_2018_NPR-A_SaleResultsMap_12122018.pdf [https://perma.cc
/C76C-J25B].
19. BLM, Notice of Intent, supra note 17.
20. Pub. L. No. 115-97, Title II, § 2001, 131 Stat. 2235 (Dec. 22, 2017).
21. Alaska's Oil and Gas Industry, RESOURCE DEV. COUNCIL,
https://www.akrdc.org/oil-and-gas [https://perma.cc/R2R6-2SMD] (last visited
Sept. 11, 2019); Kim Murphy, The Flow Has Slowed Through the Trans-Alaska
(Aug.
10,
2010,
12:00
AM),
TIMES
Oil
Pipeline,
L.A.
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-aug-10-la-na-alaska-oil20100810-story.html [https://perma.cc/G7AA-85KN].
22. Development of Alaska’s ANWR Would Increase U.S. Crude Oil
Production After 2030, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 14, 2018), https://www
.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36472 [https://perma.cc/MN7X-2EH6];
ALASKA OIL & GAS ASS’N & AM. PETROLEUM INST., COMMENTS OF THE ALASKA
OIL AND GAS ASSOCIATION AND AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE ON THE
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT’S DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
FOR THE COASTAL PLAIN OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM (2019); Elizabeth
Harball, Interior Official: ‘Millions’ More Acres in NPR-A to Open for Oil
Development, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.alaskapublic.org
/2018/08/09/interior-official-millions-more-acres-in-npr-a-to-open-for-oil-devel
opment/ [https://perma.cc/45AY-A2CA]; Letter from Albert Fogle, Vice
President, Alaska Chamber, to State Director, BLM (Jan. 22, 2019), https://
eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/projects/nepa/117408/168485/205021/Alaska_
Chamber_-_NPR-A_IAP_Scoping_Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MZA-JG6C]
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jurisdiction over this development are not adequately prepared for the
long-term costs of restoring these lands once the oil and gas are no longer
economically viable. The current health and ecological intactness of these
areas support astounding numbers of wildlife, including mammals, birds,
and fish. These species, in turn, support vibrant mixed economies of the
region’s communities.23
As experience elsewhere clearly demonstrates, the costs of plugging
and abandoning wells (P&A) and dismantlement, removal, and restoration
(collectively here, DR&R)24 are substantial. If these costs are not set aside
before development, the result may be abandonment by primary
producers, bankruptcy of subsequent operators, and costs deferred to the
State and local communities. This Article considers the damage that may
result, especially to ecologically sensitive and important areas like the
Coastal Plain and NPRA’s Special Areas, absent adequate assurances to
properly abandon and restore North Slope oil and gas fields.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) previously addressed
this topic in 2002,25 where it found bond amounts and DR&R requirements
to be inadequate. Since then, the Congressional Research Service,26 the

(discussing NPRA Scoping Comments); Positions and Priorities 2019, ALASKA
CHAMBER, http://www.alaskachamber.com/priorities-and-positions [https://perma.cc
/5MZA-JG6C] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019).
23. Shauna BurnSilver et al., Are Mixed Economies Persistent or
Transitional? Evidence Using Social Networks from Arctic Alaska, 118 AMER.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 121 (2016); E. Barrett Ristroph, Still Melting: How Climate
Change and Subsistence Laws Constrain Alaska Native Village Adaptation, 30
COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY, & ENVTL. L. REV. 246 (2019).
24. The authors use term the “DR&R” to refer collectively to all the costs
associated with plugging and abandoning wells, as well as the costs of removing
oilfield infrastructure and restoring the landscape to pre-drilling condition.
Elsewhere, plugging and abandonment of wells (P&A) is often distinguished from
removal of non-well infrastructure and land restoration, with only the latter being
referred to as DR&R. In many jurisdictions, including the State of Alaska,
separate agencies regulate P&A and other aspects of DR&R.
25. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-02-357, ALASKA’S NORTH
SLOPE: REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTORING LAND AFTER OIL PRODUCTION CEASES
54 (2002).
26. R. ELIOT CRAFTON, LAURA B. COMAY & MARC HUMPHRIES, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL45192, OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM (2018).
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Department of the Interior Inspector General,27 and GAO28 have continued
to document the inadequacies of existing law to provide for DR&R. Also,
the State of Alaska’s Department of Natural Resources (ADNR)
commissioned a “Decommissioning, Removal, and Restoration
Regulatory Review” for Alaska’s oil and gas operations, in order to better
understand how other jurisdictions balance the need to attract investment
in the oil and gas (or mining) sector while managing the financial risks
associated with potential DR&R liabilities.29 This Article adds to the
existing literature by considering the unique ecology and high costs related
to DR&R on the North Slope of Alaska, projecting the damage that recent
development plans could cause, evaluating the full range of current laws
applicable to DR&R, and suggesting specific DR&R standards that should
be considered in the overall costs of operations. Such an understanding is
crucial prior to drilling in sensitive areas of the North Slope that, up until
now, have largely been protected from drilling. Not only would there be
significant damage to important ecological areas, the potential that DR&R
efforts will be absent or minimal is high given the declining prices of oil
and increasing number of oil company asset transfers and bankruptcies.
This Article first considers the legacy of damage associated with
inadequate assurances and improper DR&R in places like Louisiana,30 the
known and potential for damage in Arctic Alaska, and the potential costs
of proper DR&R. Second, it outlines the current legal regime for DR&R
on the North Slope. While clearly inadequate to assure proper DR&R,
some aspects of this regime are better than regimes for oil and gas
development in other U.S. jurisdictions. Based on oil and gas laws in non27. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, CR-EVFWS-0002-2014, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE’S MANAGEMENT OF OIL AND
GAS ACTIVITY (2015) [hereinafter OIG].
28. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-517, NATIONAL WILDLIFE
REFUGES, OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF
OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES ON FEDERAL LANDS (2003); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-245, OIL AND GAS BONDS, BONDING
REQUIREMENTS AND BLM EXPENDITURES TO RECLAIM ORPHANED WELLS
(2010); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-292, OIL AND GAS BONDS,
BLM NEEDS A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO BETTER MANAGE POTENTIAL OIL
AND GAS WELL LIABILITY (2011).
29. See ALASKA DEP’T NAT. RES, ARCADIS, DECOMMISSIONING, REMOVAL,
AND RESTORATION REGULATORY REVIEW 2 (2014); MARY KOKS, ALL GOOD
THINGS MUST END DECOMMISSIONING OIL AND GAS FACILITIES AND
BANKRUPTCY IMPACTS 9 (2017), http://www.cailaw.org/media/files/IEL/Confer
enceMaterial/2017/oilgas/koks-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZQ2-UJVR].
30. While no state requires a bond adequate to ensure full DR&R, Louisiana
is a good study for reasons indicated in Part I.A, infra.
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U.S. jurisdictions and the regime applicable to mining and offshore oil,
this Article recommends some legal changes. Third, it provides
recommendations that BLM and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
could impose under existing laws. Finally, this Article acknowledges and
incorporates the interest by regional government, made up primarily of
indigenous residents, to maintain some level of infrastructure (e.g., roads)
beyond the life of the oil fields.
I. BACKGROUND ON DAMAGES AND RESTORATION: ONGOING FAILURES,
POTENTIAL FAILURES, AND COSTS
A. Examples of Damages Associated with Inadequate DR&R
Local impacts on wildlife and the environment related to oil and gas
development include habitat modification, facility development,
transportation corridors (pipelines and roads), wildlife mortality and
displacement, and the introduction of invasive species.31 Without a regime
ensuring proper DR&R, the number of improperly abandoned oil and gas
wells increases overtime and can continue to negatively impact the
surrounding landscapes.32 The presence of inactive and suspended wells

31. Pedro Ramirez, Jr. & Sherri Baker Mosley, Oil and Gas Wells and
Pipelines on U.S. Wildlife Refuges: Challenges for Managers, 10 PLoS ONE S1
(2015), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0124085 [https://perma.cc/8ZDUWL36]; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CUMULATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF
OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES ON ALASKA'S NORTH SLOPE (2003) [hereinafter NRC];
Terry Z. Riley et al., Impacts of Crude Oil and Natural Gas Developments on
Wildlife and Wildlife Habitat in the Rocky Mountain Region, WILDLIFE SOC’Y
TECH. REVIEW 12-02 (2012); THE WILDERNESS SOC’Y, BROKEN PROMISES, THE
REALITY OF OIL DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICA’S ARCTIC (2d ed.) (2009). Oil and gas
activity also contribute to greenhouse gas emissions, which in turn contribute to
climate change impacts. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS
I, II AND III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2014); Carl Markon et al., Alaska, in IMPACTS,
RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT, VOLUME II (D.R. Reidmiller et al (eds.) 25–26 (2018).
32. Edith Allison & Ben Mandler, The American Geosciences Institute,
Abandoned Wells What happens to Oil and Gas Wells When They Are no Longer
Productive? Petroleum and the Environment, PETROLEUM & ENVT., June 2018,
7-1, https://www.americangeosciences.org/sites/default/files/AGI_PE_Abandon
ed Wells_web_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/KC3F-4FZJ].
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can increase the risk of contamination to surface water, groundwater, and
soil; these wells may release methane or other gas.33
This Part begins with an example of an inadequate regime—that of
Louisiana, which has continually developed onshore oil and gas since
1901.34 While laws controlling Louisiana’s oilfield operations have been
in place since 1906,35 enforcement has been underfunded and, therefore,
ineffective.36 This problem worsened when major operators moved
offshore, and small independent firms with limited financial resources
began taking over onshore leases.37 Louisiana did not utilize financial
security requirements until 2000, and those only applied to select
categories of drillers.38 For wells drilled onshore prior to 2016, a bond of
$25,000 plus a charge for depth sufficed for ten wells.39
In 2015, there were 2,830 oil and gas wells drilled in Louisiana’s
National Wildlife Refuges alone.40 The status of many of these wells has
not been tracked to ensure that they are not damaging the environment.41
33. Benjamin Dachis, Blake Shaffer & Vincent Thivierge, All’s Well that
Ends Well: Addressing End-of-Life Liabilities for Oil and Gas Wells, 492 CD
HOWE INST. COMMENT. 7 (2017); JACQUELINE HO ET AL., PLUGGING THE GAPS IN
INACTIVE WELL POLICY, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE REPORT (2016).
34. History of the Industry, LA. MID-CONTINENT OIL & GAS ASS’N, http://
www.lmoga.com/resources/oil-gas-101/history-of-the-industry/ [https://perma.cc
/6NJQ-L6GL] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019); AMERICAN OIL AND GAS HISTORICAL
SOCIETY FIRST OIL DISCOVERIES, https://aoghs.org/petroleum-discoveries/
[https://perma.cc/A2CY-EY5P] (last visited May 20, 2019); KOKS, supra note 29,
at 24; J. Michael Veron, Oilfield Contamination Litigation in Louisiana: Property
Rights on Trial, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6 (2011).
35. Act 71 of 1906 prohibited setting wells on fire and required gas wells to
be plugged and abandoned. The state legislature enacted various laws until the
1930s, when what is now the Department of Natural Resource assumed regulatory
control. Veron, supra note 34, at 6.
36. Id.
37. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., MMS 2008-042, HISTORY OF THE OFFSHORE
OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN SOUTHERN LOUISIANA VOLUME I: PAPERS ON THE
EVOLVING OFFSHORE INDUSTRY 13 (2008), https://www.boem.gov/ESPIS/4
/4530.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJB4-B9HL].
38. Sue Lincoln, DeSoto Parish Emergency: All Out Of Funds, BAYOU
BRIEF, (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.bayoubrief.com/2019/02/28/desoto-parishemergency-all-out-of-funds/ [https://perma.cc/8TYN-7B38].
39. The amount has since been raised to $50,000 for up to 10 wells, $250,000
for up to 99 wells, and $500,000 for 100 or more wells, plus a charge related to
well depth. Onshore wells in waterbodies have higher rates, and offshore wells
have rates that are higher still. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 51, pt. 19 § 104 (2016).
40. Ramirez, Jr. & Mosley, supra note 31.
41. Id.
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There are chronic oil and brine leaks and spills at oil production sites, with
dead vegetation due to oilfield brine spills, trash, and abandoned wells and
oilfield equipment.42
As of 2019, there are nearly 4,000 abandoned, unplugged wells
throughout Louisiana.43 Many of them have been deteriorating for decades
and some of them are leaking.44 In 2014, the rapid decline in oil prices led
to a spike in abandonment.45 Small operators operating on thin margins
have tended to abandon wells without plugging them, knowing that the
state will not seek reimbursement for expenses under $250,000 per well.46
No agency has studied the environmental impacts of these abandoned
wells.47
Damages associated with drilling in Louisiana are not limited to
abandoned wells. Dredging canals into Louisiana’s wetlands has been a
long-standing practice to provide access to drill sites.48 The resulting
saltwater incursion has destroyed coastal wetlands and hastened coastal
erosion.49 Added to these coastal impacts is the phenomenon of land
42. Id.
43. Orphan Wellsite List, LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, http://www.dnr
.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=155 [https://perma.
cc/GJP7-RUUH] (last updated Mar. 28, 2019).
44. Lee Zurik & Tom Wright, Zurik: Orphan Wells and the Deadbeats Who
Leave Them, FOX 8 WVUE-TV, (Nov. 3, 2017), www.fox8live.com/story/3675
0057/zurik-orphan-wells-and-the-deadbeats-who-leave-them/ [https://perma.cc/7
5YM-Q3LZ].
45. Sam Karlin, What's an 'Orphan well?' Louisiana Oil Recession Leaves
Plenty of Them Behind, ADVOCATE, (Jul. 15, 2018, 11:00 PM), https://www.the
advocate.com/baton_rouge/news/business/article_a8fcdd26-7ed4-11e8-91ba-a7
1945c9252c.html https://perma.cc/9QN3-QUYB; see also Ronald Oran Jr. &
David Reiner, Who Is Responsible for Decommissioning Costs for Oil and Gas
Assets Abandoned or Sold in Bankruptcy? AM. BAR ASS’N ENERGY LITIG. (Feb.
26, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/environment
al-energy/articles/2016/winter2016-energy-who-is-responsible-for-decommission
ing-costs-for-oil-and-gas-assets-abandoned-or-sold-in-bankruptcy/ [https://perma.c
c/8U67-NTNS].
46. Zurik &Wright, supra note 44.
47. Id.
48. Donald Wayne Davis, Louisiana Canals and Their Influence on Wetland
Development 122–146 (Apr. 9, 1973) (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State
University) (on file with author, available at http://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/grad
school_disstheses/2386 [https://perma.cc/MH83-PLME]).
49. John Carey, Louisiana Wetlands Tattered by Industrial Canals, Not Just
River Levees, SCI. AM. (Dec. 1, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/carey-louisiana-wetlands-tattered-by-industrial-canals/ [https://perma.cc/
VRM7-FFH5]; Joseph Baustian, Restoration Success of Backfilling Canals in
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subsidence, which has various causes in Louisiana, including the removal
of oil and gas and the resulting decrease in reservoir pore pressure.50 These
phenomena have contributed to extreme land loss along Louisiana’s
coast—with an area greater than the size of Delaware lost between 1932
and 2016.51
Louisiana has typically addressed oilfield damage after the fact, if at
all, by allowing private landowners to litigate DR&R. Even this has been
curtailed by state legislation, requiring landowners to engage in a minitrial with the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources before a court
trial. This reduces financial incentives for landowners to seek DR&R.52
While Louisiana appears to have more oil and gas wells located in
National Wildlife Refuges than any other state,53 it is not the only state
where drilling takes place in refuges.54 Alaskans need look no further than
Coastal Louisiana Marshes 1 (May 1, 2005) (Master’s Thesis, Louisiana State
University) (on file with author, available at https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/
gradschool_theses/749 [https://perma.cc/UXS9-HBWY]).
50. Brendan Yuill, Dawn Lavoie & Denise J. Reed, Understanding
Subsidence Processes in Coastal Louisiana, 54 J. COASTAL RESEARCH 23, 32
(2009); DONALD F. BOESCH, DOUGLAS LEVIN, DAG NUMMEDAL & KEVIN
BOWLES, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., DIV. OF BIOLOGICAL SERVS., FWS/OBS83/26 SUBSIDENCE IN COASTAL LOUISIANA: CAUSES, RATES, AND EFFECTS ON
WETLANDS 17 (1983).
51. BRADY R. COUVILLION, HOLLY BECK, DONALD SCHOOLMASTER &
MICHELLE FISHER, LAND AREA CHANGE IN COASTAL LOUISIANA 1932 TO 2016:
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS MAP 3381, at 16 (2017),
https://doi.org/10.3133/sim3381 [https://perma.cc/73YS-U4D9]; Size of States,
National (U.S.) States: Size in Square Miles, STATE SYMBOLS USA, https://state
symbolsusa.org/symbol-official-item/national-us/uncategorized/states-size [https://
perma.cc/CX7W-T5C4] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
52. Act No. 1166, 2006, La. Acts 3511 (amended by Act No. 312, 2006 La.
Acts 1472).
53. CRAFTON, COMAY & HUMPHRIES, supra note 26, at 15. It also has the
highest number of refuges with oil and gas activity. Id.
54. Other states include Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Indiana,
Michigan, Missouri, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, New York,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, Utah,
Wyoming, Alaska, California, and Nevada. Id. The number of refuges differs
depending on source. See, e.g., OIG, supra note 27, at 4 (over 200 wells within
110 Refuges); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-517, NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGES, OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT AND
OVERSIGHT OF OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES ON FEDERAL LANDS (2003) (155 refuges
have past or present oil and gas activity; 105 contain a total of 4,406 oil and gas
wells—2,600 inactive wells and 1,806 active wells); Ramirez, Jr. & Mosley,
supra note 31 (5,002 wells in 107 Refuges).
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their Kenai Refuge, where, as of 2016, FWS has identified 191 nonfederal
wells and 92 federal wells.55 This has resulted in fragmentation of wildlife
habitats for brown bears and other wildlife,56 disturbance of denning bears,
wolves, and lynx during seismic exploration,57 and contamination of soils
and groundwater with toxic substances such as mercury and
polychlorinated biphenyls.58
In 2003, GAO found that FWS lacked information on the number and
location of abandoned wells throughout the refuge system and regarding
the damage associated with these wells.59 This lack of information hinders
FWS’s ability to require responsible parties to undertake needed DR&R.60
The Office of the Inspector General of the Interior Department raised
similar concerns in a 2015 report,61 finding that some refuge managers had
not even attempted to exercise authority over oil and gas operations on
their refuges.62 Managers that have enforced regulations and guidance
55. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., NON-FEDERAL OIL & GAS ACTIVITIES ON
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM LANDS (2016), https://www.fws.gov/re
fuges/oil-and-gas/pdfs/Oil-Gas-Fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2YT-ZBSG].
56. Lowell H. Suring et al., Analysis of Cumulative Effects on Brown Bears
on the Kenai Peninsula, Southcentral Alaska, 10 URSUS 107 (1998).
57. W.R. Staples & T.N. Bailey, Disturbance of and a Human Fatality
Related to Brown Bears in Dens During Winter Seismic Exploration on the Kenai
National Wildlife Refuge, Alaska (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Kenai National
Wildlife Refuge, Alaska, 1998).
58. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-517, NATIONAL WILDLIFE
REFUGES, OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF
OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES ON FEDERAL LANDS 24 (2003); TIFFANY A.S. PARSON,
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., KENAI NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE
CONTAMINANT ASSESSMENT (2001), https://www.sciencebase.gov/catalog/item/
572a2a62e4b0b13d391a092e [https://perma.cc/X93S-89A6]; NAT’L AUDUBON
SOC’Y AND DEF. OF WILDLIFE, TOXIC TUNDRA: OIL DRILLING IN AN ALASKAN
WILDLIFE REFUGE LEAVES A TOXIC LEGACY OF OIL SPILLS AND POLLUTION
(2002), http://www.protectthearctic.com/studies_toxicdrilling.html [https://perm
a.cc/4GL2-SYVB].
59. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-517, NATIONAL WILDLIFE
REFUGES, OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF
OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES ON FEDERAL LANDS 29 (2003).
60. Id. at 30.
61. OIG, supra note 27, at 5, 11. Of the 5000 wells OIG documented on refuge
lands, the status of about 3000 were identified as inactive or unknown, such that it
was unclear whether they had been plugged and properly abandoned. Id. at 12.
62. This inaction was apparently based on a 1986 Solicitor’s opinion. See id.
at 4. FWS has since found this opinion to be inapplicable. Management of NonFederal Oil and Gas Rights, 81 Fed. Reg. 79948, 79950 (Nov. 14, 2016)
[hereinafter FWS 2016 Rule].
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have not consistently done so.63 In short, there are many landscapes, even
within the Refuge system, where wells remain improperly abandoned
without the prospect of adequate DR&R.
B. Impacts of Past Oil and Gas Development on the North Slope of
Alaska
Since the mid-twentieth century, thousands of wells have been drilled
on the North Slope,64 and a great deal of infrastructure has been installed
to support oil and gas development. This Subpart gives an overview of the
damage that oil and gas development has already caused on North Slope
lands.
Seismic exploration surveys have gridded the North Slope, with over
32,000 miles of seismic trails made from 1990 to 2001.65 Seismic
exploration conducted in ANWR in the 1980s resulted in significant
impacts on tundra vegetation that persisted for decades.66 Even in recent
times, some sections of the 1980s seismic trails are still visible.67
When oil and gas exploration began on the North Slope, knowledge
about its effects on permafrost was limited.68 Trails were often cut directly
into frozen ground, and summer travel with heavy vehicles left deep ruts
that destroyed the vegetative mat protecting the permafrost.69 Many of the
early exploration wells were drilled without gravel pads, and in some cases
drilling wastes were deposited directly on the tundra.70 Later, drilling
63. OIG, supra note 27, at 5, 11. Of the 5,000 wells OIG documented on
Refuge lands, the statuses of about 3,000 were identified as inactive or unknown,
such that it was unclear whether they had been plugged and properly abandoned.
Id. at 12.
64. As of June 2019, the number of wells on the North Slope is as follows:
169 suspended, 2,308 plugged, 617 idle, and 3,095 active. Email from Winston
Hughes (AOGCC) to Barrett Ristroph, (June 12, 2019) (on file with author).
65. NRC, supra note 31, at 86.
66. Janet Jorgensen et al., Long-term Recovery Patterns of Arctic Tundra
After Winter Seismic Exploration, 20(1) ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS, 205–21
(2010).
67. Alaska Wilderness League et al., Comments on the Notice of Availability
of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Coastal Plain Oil and Gas
Leasing Program and Announcement of Public Subsistence-Related Hearings, 83
Fed. Reg. 67,337 (Dec. 28, 2018) at 49 [hereinafter Conservation Comments on
ANWR DEIS 2019]. As of 2003, some seismic trails from the 1940s are still
visible on the North Slope. See NRC, supra note 31, at 81.
68. NRC, supra note 31, at 77.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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wastes were contained in reserve pits, which often leaked.71 Although
there have been improvements in waste management over time, large
amounts of scrap metal and other solid waste have accumulated.72 There
is no comprehensive plan for the disposal of scrap metal and abandoned
rigs, and the problem will likely become more serious as facilities age and
more infrastructure accumulates.73 Even with reduced footprints in future
development, there is a substantial web of existing infrastructures that will
be added to over time.
An example of the solid waste problem is the abandoned site referred
to as Service City, consisting of about 60 acres located on state lands.
Beginning in the mid-1960s, operators used the site for staging, servicing,
and storing oil field equipment and supplies.74 Over 12 lessees made use
of the area prior to abandonment in 1986, leaving behind metal buildings,
equipment, lead acid batteries, and tons of other debris and waste.75 The
state did not revoke the area leases until 1990.76 At that time, the state
entered a cooperative agreement with three operators (BP, ARCO, and
ExxonMobil) to clean up the site.77 As of 2002, about $2 million had been
spent on this relatively small site as compared to the existing oil and gas
operating areas.78 The site is still not fully restored.79
As mentioned in the Introduction, the federal government was
responsible for many wells drilled in NPRA between 1944 and 1981.
These wells, referred to as the “legacy wells,” were never properly plugged
and abandoned. Between 2002 and 2015, BLM and the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers spent approximately $90 million remediating 18 of these 136
“legacy wells” (about $5 million per well).80 In 2014, Senator Lisa
Murkowski was able to get $50 million allocated through the Helium Act
Id.
Id. at 93.
Id.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-02-357, ALASKA’S NORTH
SLOPE: REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTORING LAND AFTER OIL PRODUCTION CEASES
54 (2002).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Site Report: Service City Pad, ALASKA DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
http://dec.alaska.gov/Applications/SPAR/PublicMVC/CSP/SiteReport/1175 [https://
perma.cc/4CB3-LT9Q] (last updated Apr. 9, 2019).
80. Alaska Legacy Wells Program, BUREAU LAND MGMT. https://www.blm
.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/alaska-legacy-wells [https://perma
.cc/ZCX5-GCQS] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019).
71.
72.
73.
74.
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to clean up legacy wells that BLM has determined to be in need of
remediation.81
Cathy Foerster, of the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
(AOGCC), the Alaska entity with the authority to require bonds for wells,
repeatedly testified before Congress and the media regarding the
inadequacy of federal DR&R for legacy wells.82 Foerster testified before
Congress that BLM’s cleanup efforts using Helium Act funding did not
follow AOGCC requirements for well closure and were unsuccessful at
plugging the two worst wells.83 BLM “ended up leaving both in such a
compromised condition that, when they go back to fix them, it will cost a
whole lot more money and may not be doable.”84 According to BLM, it
spent $10 million of the Helium Act funding in 2015 to plug only three
legacy wells in one location and conduct surface clean up at well sites in
another location.85 BLM indicated that it planned to spend the remaining
$40 million in federal funding to plug and clean up an additional 18 of the
remaining 47 wells that it assessed as in need of remediation.86 This would
be a little more than $2 million per well, which may be insufficient if the
81. Id.; Helium Stewardship Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-40, § 10(b), 127
Stat. 545 (Oct. 2, 2013).
82. See, e.g., Provide Oversight on Remediation of Federal Legacy Wells in
the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, 112th Cong. 11-27 (2012) (statement of Cathy Foerster,
Engineering Commissioner and Chair, Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76612/html/CHR
G-112shrg76612.htm [https://perma.cc/PSM3-7S44]; Elizabeth Harball, State
Regulator Pushes for Stronger Laws to Deal With Abandoned Oil Wells, ALASKA
PUB. MEDIA (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.alaskapublic.org/2018/03/06/stateregulator-pushes-for-stronger-laws-to-deal-with-abandoned-oil-wells/ [https://per
ma.cc/86E5-TPAV]; Nick Snow, US House Considers Moving Federal Onshore
Oil, Gas Oversite to States, OIL & GAS J. (Nov. 27, 2017), http://digital.ogj
.com/ogjournal/20171127?pg=23#pg23 [https://perma.cc/Q3RG-BPC7].
83. Cathy Foerster, Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission,
PowerPoint Presentation for the Alaska State Legislature House Resources
Standing Committee, (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.akleg.gov/basis/Meeting/Detail
?Meeting=HRES%202017-02-08%2013:00:00#tab3_4 [https://perma.cc/Q6FQL5N7].
84. Id.
85. Press Release, Bureau of Land Management, BLM Announces Major
Clean-Up Effort of Legacy Wells in the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska
(Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.blm.gov/press-release/blm-announces-major-cleaneffort-legacy-wells-national-petroleum-reserve-alaska [https://perma.cc/HDM6XFGE].
86. Id.
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previous three wells are any indication. These remediation processes can
be long and complex, as the wells are old and poorly documented, and
some obstacles may not be anticipated in advance—issues that likely
expand over time.
More recently, Foerster has referred to the phenomenon of smaller,
financially unstable operators taking over leases, not unlike what
happened in Louisiana decades before.87 This phenomenon is already
coming to pass in Alaska; in 2019, BP sold all of its upstream and
midstream assets (around $5.6 billion) to a small company known as
Hilcorp Energy.88 Such takeovers are problematic because the smaller
operators are less likely to have the resources to pay for DR&R when
production ceases. For example, in 2018, the bankruptcy of Aurora Gas
left the state financially responsible for cleaning up three wells left on state
land.89
Blowouts (uncontrolled releases from wells) and spills associated with
North Slope exploration and production have resulted in additional
damage requiring remediation. BP had two blowouts from exploration
wells in April 2017 and December 2018, and Repsol had a blowout in
February 2012 from an exploration well.90 For Fiscal Year 2018, the
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) documented
2,069 new spill cases throughout the state, including 40,299 gallons that
spilled on the North Slope. Yet ADEC only billed responsible parties for
cleanup in 294 cases, and only took legal action in three cases.91

87. Harball, supra note 82; cf. ARCADIS, supra note 29, at ES-2; NRC supra
note 31, at 95 (as leases on the North Slope are transferred from the large
multinational companies to smaller independent firms, the smaller concerns are
less likely to have the resources to pay for DR&R when production ceases).
88. Brian Scheid, Does BP's Alaska Exit Spell Trouble for Trump
Administration's Oil, Gas Plans for State? S&P GLOBAL (Aug. 28, 2019, 9:31
PM), https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/082819
-does-bps-alaska-exit-spell-trouble-for-trump-administrations-oil-gas-plans-forstate [https://perma.cc/7JXP-3UTB].
89. Harball, supra note 82. A similar example is the 2009 bankruptcy of
Pacific Energy Resources, which owned the Osprey platform in Cook Inlet,
Alaska. A new operator resumed operations on Osprey, saving the state from
spending tens of millions of its own funds to address the remaining platform.
Kristen Nelson, Bonding for DR&R for Platforms? DNR Considering Changes to
Regs, 18 PETROLEUM NEWS (Sept. 01, 2013), http://www.petroleumnews.com/
pntruncate/817883809.shtml [https://perma.cc/SX5R-VFNF].
90. Conservation Comments on ANWR DEIS 2019, supra note 67, at 93.
91. ALASKA DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, SPILL PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2018 25 (2019).
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In short, even though the oil and gas industry may be modernizing
with more efficient and environmentally sound technology, the problem
of ensuring DR&R remains. The next Subpart provides specific examples
of costs related to inadequate DR&R.
C. Examples of DR&R Costs
Costs of DR&R can differ based on a variety of factors, including the
depth, age, and condition of wells; the concentration of wells in a given
area; the difficulty of site access; the nature of support infrastructure at the
site (i.e., roads, buildings, pipelines, and other structures, as well as the
gravel pads they are built upon); the availability of plugging services;
regulatory requirements; and any long-term damage done to the site as a
result of operations (including spills).92 Agencies have done relatively
little to evaluate the true costs of DR&R and match bonds to these costs.
The following are some examples of what agencies have spent in recent
decades plugging orphaned (improperly abandoned) wells,93 as compared
to bond values:
(a) A review of the costs to plug abandoned wells and reclaim the
sites in Wyoming between 1997 and 2007 found that costs
averaged approximately $29,000 per well, while the bond amount
per well was approximately $6,000 (or $1.79 per foot).94 The
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission plugged 452
wells between 1997 and 2014. The cheapest well cost $569 to
plug, while the most expensive cost $527,829.95
92. Jacqueline S. Ho et al., Managing Environmental Liability: An
Evaluation of Bonding Requirements for Oil and Gas Wells in the United States,
52 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 3908, 3910 (2018); Matt Andersen & Roger Coupal,
Economic Issues and Policies Affecting Reclamation in Wyoming’s Oil and Gas
Industry, Paper at National Meeting of the American Society of Mining and
Reclamation, Billings, MT 40, 42 (2009).
93. Information on these costs is relatively limited. See ARCADIS, supra note
29, at ES2; Erovie-OgheneUyoyou-karo Afieroho et al., From Declared Asset
Retirement Obligations to a Decommissioning Cost Estimate for Onshore Crude
Oil Fields in Nigeria, J. ENVT’L MGMT. 207, 208 (2017). Thus, this Part simply
collects whatever information the authors could find with an Internet search. Since
the costs depend on so many different factors, the authors did not attempt to come
up with a definitive cost per well or lease.
94. Andersen & Coupal, supra note 92, at 11.
95. Stephanie Joyce & Jordan Wirfs-Brock, The Rising Cost of Cleaning Up
After Oil and Gas, WYO. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 1, 2015), http://insideenergy.org/2015/
10/01/the-rising-cost-of-cleaning-up-after-oil-and-gas/ [https://perma.cc/36FNLM5Y].
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(b) In 2010, the General Accounting Office estimated an average
reclamation cost of $12,788 per well (more than $1 billion total)
for the 88,537 wells on federal land.96 At that time, the operators
of those wells had posted only $162 million in bonds, about 10%
of the costs of proper P&A.97
(c) In 2011, plugging a 3,000 foot-deep abandoned well and restoring
the site in western Pennsylvania was estimated to cost
approximately $60,000, although the bonding amount for such a
well could be as little as $2,500.98
(d) In Texas, the revenue from required bonds covered just 15.9% of
the cost to plug wells in fiscal year 2015.99
(e) A 2017 comparison of well plugging costs and bonds in 13 states
found that costs exceeded bonds in all states except Oklahoma. In
Pennsylvania, 98% of the wells (2,824 out of 2,866) cost more to
plug than the average bond, with the costliest 1% of wells
exceeding the bond by more than $64,000 for each project.100
(f) P&A costs for gas wells located in Alaska’s Cook Inlet were
estimated by a private contractor to be $100,000 to $250,000 per
well, and by the State to be as much as $1 million per well.101 P&A
costs for another well in the same area (the Shadura well) were
estimated at about $500,000 (including the cost of constructing an
ice road to access the well).102
While there is some guidance on costs for plugging orphaned wells, there
is a dearth of information available on the full costs of DR&R—a process
96. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-245, OIL AND GAS BONDS,
BONDING REQUIREMENTS AND BLM EXPENDITURES TO RECLAIM ORPHANED
WELLS (2010).
97. ARCADIS, supra note 29, at ES-13.
98. Austin L. Mitchell & Elizabeth A. Casman, Economic Incentives and
Regulatory Framework for Shale Gas Well Site Reclamation in Pennsylvania, 45
ENVT’L. SCI. & TECH. 9506, 9508 (2011).
99. R.R. COMM’N OF TEX. SUNSET, ADVISORY COMMISSION STAFF REPORT
2016−2017 (2016), https://www.sunset.texas.gov/public/uploads/files/reports/Rail
road%20Commission%20of%20Texas%20Staff%20Report_4-29-16.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7K3R-P3JV].
100. Ho et al., supra note 92, at 52.
101. Alan Bailey, A Bonding Challenge Aurora Exploration Appeals AOGCC’s
$6 Million Order for Nicolai Creek, 22 PETROLEUM NEWS (Sept. 24, 2017),
http://www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/864924693.shtml [https://perma.cc/6B
9S-RAUH].
102. Id.
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that goes beyond just properly plugging and abandoning wells. A few
examples are notable:
(a) A 2003 GAO report indicates that FWS spent $387,100 to clean
up 14 oil- or gas-related sites between fiscal years 1991 and
2002.103
(b) In 2001, Phillips Petroleum estimated the average DR&R cost for
removing existing infrastructure and restoring the landscape at
one North Slope drilling site (Alpine) to be between $500,000 and
$1 million per acre.104
(c) As of 2003, the Army Corps of Engineers estimated that the
average cost of gravel decontamination, reuse, and revegetation
on the North Slope is approximately $1 million per acre of gravel
picked up.105
(d) A 2017 estimate based on costs stated in financial reports put the
average cost of DR&R for one onshore “facility” in Nigeria
(presumably a unit operated by a single operator) at $30 million.106
(e) A 2018 article on DR&R in the North Sea near the United
Kingdom reported that the company Oil and Gas UK expects oil
companies to spend $22.05 billion on removing around 1,600
wells, 100 platforms, and 5,500 km of pipelines over seven
years.107
Despite recognition of the detriment that can result from inadequate bonds
and DR&R policies, there are few model policies among state agencies.
States generally require bonds between around $5,000 and $10,000 per
well, and allow a “blanket” (statewide) bond from around $50,000 to
$150,000 once an operator reaches a certain number of wells.108 California
103. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-517, NATIONAL WILDLIFE
REFUGES, OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF
OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES ON FEDERAL LANDS 29 (2003).
104. NRC, supra note 31, at 94.
105. Id.
106. Afieroho et al., supra note 93, at 214.
107. Shadia Nasralla, Dismantling the Oil Industry: Rough North Sea Waters
Test New Ideas, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2018, 1:11 AM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-north-sea-oil-decommissioning-analysi/dismantling-the-oil-industryrough-north-sea-waters-test-new-ideas-idUSKCN1NW0IL [https://perma.cc/HQ
37-UPJK?type=image].
108. INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMM’N, STATE FINANCIAL ASSURANCE
REQUIREMENTS, (2016), http://iogcc.ok.gov/Websites/iogcc/images/Financial_
Assurances_FINAL_web.pdf.
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has one of the highest blanket bonds, at $3,000,000 for any number of
wells beyond 10,000.109 North Carolina and North Dakota are among the
few jurisdictions not to have a blanket bond.110
D. Potential for Damage to the North Slope’s Coastal and Special Areas
This Subpart provides an overview of the long-term damage to the
North Slope, particularly to the Coastal Plain, which bonds and DR&R
policies should address in order to allow these areas to resume healthy
ecological function. In the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for
ANWR leasing, BLM acknowledges that there will be permanent change
as a result of gravel mining, gravel placement (even if gravel is
subsequently removed), degradation of permafrost, loss or degradation of
wildlife habitat, and loss of subsistence use.111 Yet, the EIS does little to
offer solutions for minimizing these changes.
While the 2017 Tax Act theoretically limited the area for surface
development to 2,000 acres,112 the EIS interprets this limit to exclude
seismic survey trails, barge landings, or pipelines (except for the footprint
of the posts holding the pipeline in the air).113 Thus, the 200 to 240 miles
of anticipated pipelines are not counted toward the limit—only the 8.4 to
10 acres taken up by the vertical supports for the pipelines are
considered.114 Likewise, seismic activity, which may cover the entire
Coastal Plain, does not count toward the limit.115 Further, BLM has
interpreted the 2,000-acre limit to be a “rolling limit,” rather than a
109. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3205.
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-378; N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-15(2). North
Dakota does allow a “blanket bond” of $100,000 to cover up to six wells within
the state, but if the operator would like to operate more than six wells, it must pay
an additional bond for the individual wells or set of six.
111. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
FOR THE COASTAL PLAIN OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM, Vol. 1, 3-63, 3-69, 3348 (2019), https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/eplanning/planAndProject
Site.do?methodName=dispatchToPatternPage&currentPageId=152110 [https://
perma.cc/Z2SL-XH5N] [hereinafter ANWR FEIS].
112. 16 U.S.C. § 3143(c)(3).
113. ANWR FEIS, supra note 111, at Vol. 1, 1-7.
114. Id. at Vol. 2, B-25.
115. The proposal of one company alone would directly impact 150,000 acres
and would involve around 37,800 miles of seismic lines. SA EXPL., INC., MARSH
CREEK 3D PLAN OF OPERATIONS WINTER SEISMIC SURVEY (2018),
https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/projects/nepa/111085/153349/187888
/Marsh_Creek_Plan_of_Operations_Submitted_May2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
24BK-CJUS].
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cumulative limit, such that lands no longer in use do not count toward the
limit.116 It is not clear how and when BLM will track and tally the 2,000acre limit to ensure it is followed and lands no longer in use have been
restored, or what that benchmark of restoration is.117 There are no
requirements to limit the 2,000 acres to a centralized place, meaning that
habitats across the entire leasing area could ultimately be impacted and
fragmented, or left in a compromised state.
Gravel pads and roads directly cover and kill tundra vegetation, but
their effects extend beyond their footprints. Road dust, especially within
100 feet of a road, can settle onto surrounding permafrost and cause it to
melt.118 This dust, depending on the origin, can contain contaminants (e.g.,
lead and zinc around the Red Dog port access road; asbestos on the
prospective Ambler road). Roads can displace wildlife, change
hydrological patterns, and assist in the dispersal of nonnative plants.119
The DR&R of Arctic landscapes is complicated where gravel and
other surface activity have disturbed the insulating vegetative mat, because
the melting of the underlying permafrost is extremely difficult to reverse
and can continue long after the initial disturbance ends.120 Areas where
gravel has been poorly placed retain moisture and nutrients, slowing the
recovery processes.121 The potential cumulative effects to soils and
permafrost can extend well beyond the limited footprint of the program
area.122 Natural recovery of tundra vegetation may occur on a timeframe
that could take millennia or may never occur.123 There is not a single
tundra rehabilitation site that has returned to its original state in thirty-plus
years of tundra rehabilitation. Even with intensive rehabilitation efforts,
the recovery process takes at least decades.124 For areas where there has
been thermal slumping or subsidence, rehabilitation is very expensive and

116. ANWR FEIS supra note 111, at Vol. 1, 3-58.
117. Conservation Comments on ANWR DEIS 2019, supra note 67, at 13–14.
118. BENJAMIN SULLENDER, AUDUBON ALASKA, ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF
ROAD AND AIRCRAFT-BASED ACCESS TO OIL INFRASTRUCTURE 17 (2017), https:
//ak.audubon.org/sites/g/files/amh551/f/road_aircraft_access_report_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5GBQ-3NMF].
119. NRC, supra note 31, at 77.
120. Id. at 90.
121. Id.
122. Martha K. Raynolds et al., Cumulative Geoecological Effects of 62 Years
of Infrastructure and Climate Change in Ice-Rich Permafrost Landscapes,
Prudhoe Bay Oilfield, Alaska, 20 GLOBAL CHANGE BIO. 1211 (2014).
123. SULLENDER, supra note 118, at 16–17.
124. Id. at 17.
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likely impossible.125 The North Slope Science Initiative found that even
when gravel structures are removed and native species are transplanted to
the reclaimed area, plants cover only 10% of the area after 10 years.126 In
some instances, it may never be possible to restore an area to its previous
condition, particularly where disturbance has contributed to permafrost
melt.127 In the ANWR FEIS, BLM acknowledges that “[r]eclamation has
not been proven for gravel removal in the arctic environment once
operations have ceased.”128
The impacts of ice roads are substantially less than those of gravel
roads and pads but more severe than those of seismic trails.129 Ice roads
can persist into other seasons and can severely alter hydrology, natural
thermal regimes, and cause a wide variety of ecological impacts on tundra
vegetation.130
Seismic activity, while less harmful than roads, may still contribute to
permafrost melt and water quality impacts.131 Three-dimensional seismic
studies conducted with 56,000-pound “thumper” trucks, bulldozers and
dozens of heavy vehicles, can result in even more damage than the
previous two-dimensional studies in ANWR, as the seismic lines are much
closer together.132
To summarize this Part, oil and gas development has already left
significant marks on the North Slope, even with a history that is relatively
short compared to other states. Precise DR&R costs are largely unknown,
but there are many examples of well plugging costs in the Lower 48 states.
DR&R costs on the North Slope would be higher given the remoteness and
Arctic conditions. Even if wells are properly plugged, numerous buildings
and gravel infrastructures remain, and a great deal of damage associated
with permafrost melt if not fully restored. Given these stakes, it would
seem logical to impose appropriate bonds and other safeguards to avoid
permanent damage. Yet, as discussed in the next Part, the current legal
regime for DR&R fails to provide such safeguards.
125. Id.
126. NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH DEP’T OF PLANNING & COMMUNITY SERVICES,
OIL AND GAS TECHNICAL REPORT: PLANNING FOR OIL & GAS ACTIVITIES IN THE
NATIONAL PETROLEUM RESERVE – ALASKA 139 (2014) [hereinafter NSB].
127. Id. at 141.
128. ANWR FEIS, supra note 111, at Vol. 1, 3-71.
129. Id. at 88.
130. SULLENDER, supra note 118, at 17.
131. NPRA EIS/IAP 2012, supra note 16, at Vol. 1, 115.
132. Jorgensen et al., supra note 66, at 219 (citing BUREAU LAND MGMT.,
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT #93476: CONDUCT 3-D SEISMIC, ANADARKO
(2008)).
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E. Potential for Restoring the North Slope’s Coastal and Special Areas
Some restoration efforts have already taken place on the North Slope.
These efforts shed light on what tactics are likely to be successful and the
time frames in which land can be restored, although many unknowns
remain. An important example of restoration work relates to the 1999
agreement providing for the merger of BP and ARCO.133 BP and Phillips
Petroleum (which bought ARCO’s assets in Alaska) agreed to spend
$10,000,000 (or more if needed) to assess and clean up (under the direction
of ADEC) 14 orphan sites on the North Slope by 2007.134 ADEC determined
that this obligation was satisfied in 2005, with total expenditures of
approximately $10,100,000.135 A second requirement, which is ongoing
through the life of the merger, is to inventory and remove abandoned barrels
encountered as part of seismic or exploration activities.136
A third requirement, which had not been satisfied as of the most recent
publicly available ADEC report on the subject, is to cleanup existing BP
and ARCO sites.137 A fourth requirement, satisfied in 2004, is to close
inactive reserve pits.138 Additional requirements include financial support
over 10 years for a North Slope spill response organization, development
of a corrosion monitoring program (ongoing), and payment of $500,000
each year for 10 years for additional cleanup and spill response research.
Although BP’s work has not resulted in complete DR&R for all of the
relevant sites, it has demonstrated the potential for and ability to improve
DR&R through research and long-term monitoring. It is unclear whether
this DR&R will continue in light of BP’s transfer of assets to the smaller
Hilcorp Energy.
A comprehensive DR&R plan that encompasses more than a few
isolated sites will require close attention to the level of restoration (the
replacement of lost habitat features, species, and processes that were
present prior to disturbance) versus rehabilitation (the conversion of a
133. STATE OF ALASKA, BRITISH PETROLEUM & ATL. RICHFIELD CO.,
CHARTER FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALASKAN NORTH SLOPE (1999) [hereinafter
BP Charter]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-02-357,
ALASKA’S NORTH SLOPE, REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTORING LANDS AFTER OIL
PRODUCTION CEASES 53 (2002).
134. BP Charter, supra note 133, at 7.
135. ALASKA DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, CHARTER FOR DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ALASKAN NORTH SLOPE, THE ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSERVATION’S 2008–2009 REPORT 3 (2008).
136. BP Charter, supra note 133, at 7.
137. ALASKA DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 135, at 3.
138. Id. at 4.
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disturbed site into functional habitat for plants and animals without
necessarily restoring the original species and processes).139 Such a plan
will need to address issues raised in the National Research Council’s
(NRC) Cumulative Environmental Effects of Oil and Gas Activities on
Alaska’s North Slope Report.140 In 2003, NRC reported that only 1% of
the roughly 3,733 hectares of tundra habitat on the North Slope covered
by gravel roads, pads, airstrips, and other facilities, has been rehabilitated,
either naturally or from revegetation efforts.141 NRC attributed this lack of
restoration to challenges related to “technical and natural constraints
imposed by the harsh environment of the North Slope; lack of clear
regulatory requirements governing the level and timing of restoration;
uncertainty about whether currently used sites will be required in the
future; contamination and liability concerns; and the high cost of removing
facilities and restoring sites in the region”142 The latter note to high costs
is central to our review here.
Substantial costs and time are needed to develop a specific plan for each
site within an operating area, implement the necessary corrective actions,
monitor progress over decades, and adjust key targets as necessary over such
long timelines.143 Establishing plant cover alone can provide insulation and
stop erosional processes associated with thermokarst,144 but restoring former
(or comparable) plant assemblages that provide equivalently good habitat
for wildlife remains challenging. Furthermore, the long-term impacts of
installing and removing infrastructure alter the landscape both physically
(e.g., provision of vertical structures; thermokarst) and biologically (e.g.,
destroying vegetation communities).145 Such alteration leads to impacts on

139. NRC, supra note 31, at 90.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Janet G. Kidd, Bill Streever, Michael R. Joyce & Lloyd Fanter, Wetland
Restoration of an Exploratory Well on Alaska's North Slope: A Learning
Experience, 22 Ecological Restoration 30 (2004); Bill Streever et al.,
Environmental Change and Potential Impacts: Applied Research Priorities for
Alaska's North Slope 64 ARCTIC 390 (2011); Bill Streever et al., Evaluation of
Percent Cover Requirements for Revegetation of Disturbed Sites on Alaska’s
North Slope, 56 ARCTIC 234 (2003).
144. Bruce C. Forbes & Robert L. Jefferies, Revegetation of Disturbed Arctic
Sites: Constraints and Applications, 88 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 15 (1999).
145. Jorgensen et al., supra note 62; Raynolds et al., supra note 122.
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wildlife, including birds146 and caribou.147 All of these impacts are
exacerbated by a warming climate.148 While larger companies, such as BP
and ConocoPhillips, may be willing to invest in research to improve
restoration, smaller operators likely will not. In short, the costs of research
and monitoring must be considered in determining the actual costs of DR&R
on Alaska’s North Slope.149 Such consideration, which should involve the
co-creation of restoration objectives with local experts, could provide longterm economic opportunities associated with a comprehensive return of
operating areas to healthy ecological conditions.150
II. LEGAL REGIME FOR DR&R FOR THE NORTH SLOPE
This Part outlines the range of agencies and laws that govern North
Slope oil and gas activity. Despite the authority for requiring adequate
bonds and DR&R plans at multiple levels, government entities have
waited to take meaningful action until after all oil production in a unit has
ceased.151 Some of the reluctance to take such action relates to a desire to
leave infrastructure in place for future use.152 This is a practical
consideration for wells and equipment if there are sufficient oil and gas
reserves remaining to allow additional development. Likewise, leaving
146. Rebecca Bentzen et al., Assessing Development Impacts on Arctic
Nesting Birds Using Real and Artificial Nests, 40 POLAR BIOLOGY 1527 (2017).
147. Robert Rodrigues, Microhabitat Variables Influencing Nest‐site
Selection by Tundra Birds, 4 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 110 (1994).
148. Raynolds et al., supra note 122.
149. See Sharon J. Riley, Many of Albertaʼs ‘Reclaimedʼ Wells Aren’t Actually
Reclaimed: Government Presentation, NARWHAL (Dec. 6, 2018), https://thenar
whal.ca/many-of-albertas-reclaimed-wells-arent-actually-reclaimed-government
-presentation/ [https://perma.cc/5MU5-U872].
150. Yadav Uprety et al., Contribution of Traditional Knowledge to
Ecological Restoration: Practices and Applications 19 ECOSCIENCE 225 (2012);
Victoria Reyes‐García et al., The Contributions of Indigenous Peoples and Local
Communities to Ecological Restoration, 27 RESTORATION ECOLOGY 3 (2019);
Timothy C. Cater, Charles Hopson & Bill Streever, The Use of the Iñupiaq
Technique of Tundra Sodding to Rehabilitate Wetlands in Northern Alaska, 68
ARCTIC 435 (2015).
151. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-02-357, ALASKA’S
NORTH SLOPE, REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTORING LANDS AFTER OIL PRODUCTION
CEASES 10 (2002). GAO’s finding in 2002 appears to hold true in 2019. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-250, OIL AND GAS WELLS, BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS DATA AND OVERSIGHT OF ITS POTENTIAL
LIABILITIES (2018). See infra Part II; See generally NSB, supra note 126.
152. ARCADIS, supra note 29, at ES-14; NSB, supra note 126, at 134–35.
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roads and gravel pads in place may be practical if nearby communities
intend to use them. But where future use is unlikely, DR&R should begin
as soon as possible. Problematically, under the current regime, there are
no firm requirements for oil and gas operators to ensure adequate DR&R
prior to undertaking exploration and production on the North Slope.
A. Federal Laws Applicable Across the North Slope
1. Army Corps Wetlands Mitigation Policy
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act authorizes the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers to issue permits for the discharge of any type of fill material
into waters of the United States, including wetlands, regardless of land
ownership. In 1990, the Environment Protection Agency (EPA) and the
Army Corps developed a policy to avoid net losses of wetlands,
establishing a permitting protocol for avoidance and minimization of
wetland destruction, and allowing compensatory mitigation for
unavoidable impacts.153 Regulations issued in 2008 revised and clarified
requirements for compensatory mitigation.154
Because virtually all of the Arctic Coastal Plain consists of wetlands,
nearly all earth-disturbing construction should require Army Corps
permits that avoid or mitigate wetland loss.155 But historically, permit
requirements for North Slope projects have been weak.156 In 2018, the
EPA and Army Corps signed an agreement to provide for “flexibilities” in
the permitting process given the abundance of wetlands in Alaska.157
The agreement stated that avoiding and restoring wetlands in a given
153. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY CONCERNING THE DETERMINATION OF MITIGATION UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT SECTION 404(B)(1) GUIDELINES (1990).

154. Army Corps & EPA, Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic
Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19594, 19595 (Apr. 10, 2008). 33 C.F.R. § 332 (2008);
40 C.F.R. § 230 (2008).
155. NRC, supra note 31, at 91.
156. Id.
157. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY CONCERNING THE DETERMINATION OF MITIGATION UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT SECTION 404(B)(1) GUIDELINES (2018). The agreement (June 15,
2018) updates and replaces previous agreements—Clarification of the Clean
Water Act Section 404 Memorandum of Agreement on Mitigation (Jan. 24, 1992),
and Statements on the Mitigation Sequence and No Net Loss of Wetlands in
Alaska (May 13, 1994).
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watershed may not be practical, such that compensatory mitigation could
occur elsewhere or in a different format (“out-of-kind compensatory
mitigation.”) Further, “[a]pplying a less rigorous permit review for small
projects with minor environmental impacts is consistent with the Section
404 program regulations.” The Army Corps identifies the requirement for
compensatory mitigation on a case-by-case basis during permit review.158
Thus, there is no overarching Army Corps policy that requires wetland
restoration following oil and gas development on the North Slope. Indeed,
in its 2018 approval of the Greater Mooses Two development project in
NPRA, the Army Corps did not require any compensatory mitigation at
all.159
Under the Obama Administration, Secretarial Order 3330 expanded
the idea of wetlands compensation by initiating an overarching strategy to
compensate for landscape-wide impacts from industrial development.160
Based on this guidance, BLM developed a draft regional mitigation
strategy to guide oil and gas activity in the northeastern portion of
NPRA,161 but some of the essential stakeholders in the region, represented
by the Native entity Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (ASRC), felt that
BLM did not adequately involve local indigenous voices.162 The Trump

158. ARMY CORPS, ALASKA DISTRICT COMPENSATORY MITIGATION
THOUGHT PROCESS (2018), https://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/
regulatory/2018MitigationThoughtProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/XG7L-BU72].
159. BUREAU LAND MGMT., PROPOSED GREATER MOOSES TOOTH TWO
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
FOR THE ALPINE SATELLITE DEVELOPMENT PLAN, JOINT RECORD OF DECISION
AND PERMIT EVALUATION WITH THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 56 (2018)
[hereinafter GMT2 ROD].
160. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretarial Order 3330, Improving Mitigation
Policies and Practices of the Department of the Interior (Oct. 31, 2013).
161. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DRAFT REGIONAL MITIGATION STRATEGY FOR
THE NORTHEASTERN NATIONAL PETROLEUM RESERVE IN ALASKA (2016).
162. ASRC and the ASRC-sponsored entity Voice of the Arctic have
published criticisms regarding Obama decisions curtailing oil and gas activity on
the North Slope, arguing that these decisions did not adequately involve Native
stakeholders. See Climate and Energy Agreement with Canada Concern for Voice
of the Arctic Inupiat, UQALUGAANICH (Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Barrow,
Alaska), Feb. 25, 2016, at 23. https://issuu.com/iaminupiaq/docs/1q_2016
_newsletter_final
[https://perma.cc/5CUG-S9CH].
Federal
government
consultation with Alaska Native Villages, Alaska Native Corporations, and tribes
regarding projects that may affect them is required by Executive Order 13,175.
Executive Order 13,175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments (Nov. 6, 2000).
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Administration revoked Secretarial Order 3330,163 and compensatory
mitigation on public lands is now entirely voluntary.164
2. Bureau of Land Management DR&R Regulations
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 is BLM’s
“organic act” that establishes the agency's multiple-use land management
mandate.165 The Act does not have a general provision related to DR&R,
but BLM has issued regulations applicable to wells on BLM-managed
lands across the nation. The regulations require an operator to plug and
abandon a well in which oil or gas is not encountered in paying quantities,
unless the well is approved for use for injection or disposal.166 DR&R
requirements are vague: “Upon the conclusion of operations, the operator
shall reclaim the disturbed surface in a manner approved or reasonably
prescribed by the authorized officer.”167 DR&R plans are not necessarily
required, although the authorized officer may request “a contingency plan
. . . describing procedures to be implemented to protect life, property, and
the environment.”168 Thus, there are no clear expectations regarding
DR&R outcomes and monitoring of these outcomes.
BLM regulations generally require operators to have one of the
following types of bond coverage: (1) individual lease bonds of at least
$10,000 covering all of an operator’s wells under one lease;169 (2)
statewide bonds of at least $25,000 covering all of an operator’s leases in
one state;170 or (3) nationwide bonds of at least $150,000 covering all of
an operator’s leases in the United States.171 BLM also allows an operator
to obtain a unit-wide bond for an approved unit agreement.172 Bond

163. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3360, Rescinding Authorities
Inconsistent with Secretary's Order 3349, “American Energy Independence.”
164. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM NO. 2019-018,
COMPENSATORY MITIGATION (2018), https://www.blm.gov/policy/im-2019-018
[https://perma.cc/47KC-K5DG].
165. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 94th Cong. (Oct. 21. 1976), 43 U.S.C. 1701–1785.
166. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-4 (1982).
167. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-1(b) (1982).
168. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-1(c) (1988).
169. 43 C.F.R. § 3104.2 (1988).
170. 43 C.F.R. § 3104.3(a) (1988).
171. 43 C.F.R. § 3104.3(b) (1988).
172. 43 C.F.R. § 3104.4 (1988).
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amounts have not increased since 1988,173 and there has never been a
policy requiring funds received for bonds to be set aside for DR&R.174
Regulations give the authorizing officer some degree of flexibility to
increase the bond amount or change its format. As an alternative to a bond,
insurance is an allowable financial guarantee.175 The officer may increase
the amount if an operator poses a risk due to a history of previous
violations, unpaid royalties, or the officer’s determination that the costs of
DR&R exceeds the present value of the bond.176 During a transfer of a
lease, the officer may increase the amount of the lessee’s statewide or
nationwide bond,177 or the officer may refuse to transfer the lease if the
bond covering activities on that lease is “insufficient.”178
In 2011, GAO found that BLM was not adequately implementing its
policies for reviewing bond adequacy and managing idle and orphan
wells.179 BLM issued a 2012 well review policy and a 2013 bond adequacy
review policy. The 2012 policy has general guidelines for evaluating
whether wells and leases are active, but does not provide for DR&R other
than stating that the agency “will require the operator to immediately plug
and abandon all the wells and reclaim all associated surface disturbance”
once the lease terminates.180 The 2013 policy gives the agency’s
authorizing official broad discretion to determine an appropriate bond. A
bond “in an amount equal to the actual costs to plug and abandon the
subject well and adequately reclaim the lands” is required if BLM has
demanded payment under a bond for the same operator within the last five
years.181

173. BLM, 53 Fed. Reg. 22839 (June 17, 1988); BLM, 53 Fed. Reg. 31958
(Aug. 22, 1988).
174. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-250, OIL AND GAS WELLS,
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS DATA AND OVERSIGHT
OF ITS POTENTIAL LIABILITIES 26 (2018).
175. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.555 (2000).
176. 43 C.F.R. § 3104.5 (1988).
177. 43 C.F.R. § 3106.6-2 (1988).
178. 43 C.F.R. § 3106.7-1 (1988).
179. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. GAO-11-292, OIL AND GAS BONDS:
BLM NEEDS A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO BETTER MANAGE POTENTIAL OIL
AND GAS WELL LIABILITY (2011).
180. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM NO. 2012-181,
IDLE WELL REVIEW AND DATA ENTRY INTO THE AUTOMATED FLUID MINERALS
SUPPORT SYSTEM (2012).
181. Id.; see also 30 U.S.C. §226(g) (indicating that BLM shall not grant a
lease to an applicant that has previously failed to comply with DR&R
requirements).
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Problematically, an officer may lack information regarding an
operator’s noncompliance in other jurisdictions.182 Once a bond is in place,
it may be difficult for BLM to recover any additional costs from the
operator. Operators may not respond to violation notices, and BLM has
little leverage when operators go bankrupt or reorganize in an effort to
avoid reclamation.183 Even in situations where an officer is aware of
noncompliance, the officer may reduce the bond if the operator is
“undertaking normal operating practices, such as plugging and
abandoning a well(s).”184
BLM updated its oil and gas rules in 2015 but opted not to increase
bond amounts. BLM reasoned that its regulations already allow the
authorizing official to set a higher bond rate if deemed necessary.185 In
2018, GAO issued another report critical of BLM’s DR&R policies.186 In
response, a 2018 BLM instructional memo added more details regarding
factors that trigger review of an operator’s bond.187 Yet the memo does not
require the officer to actually raise a bond, and continues to provide
discretion to reduce bonds. It is not clear how often BLM actually acts on
its authority to require an operator to pay a higher bond. In short, BLM
does not have a meaningful system to impose bond amounts above the
minimum standards in the regulations. Thus, under the current regulations,
an operator may pay as little as $150,000 for all its wells across the nation,
even if this may not fully address a single well.
3. Policies Specific to the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska
The regulatory regime for NPRA differs somewhat from other BLMmanaged land, since the Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act188
requires BLM to hold regular lease sales189 while also giving “maximum
182. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-250, OIL AND GAS WELLS,
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS DATA AND OVERSIGHT
OF ITS POTENTIAL LIABILITIES 28 (2018).
183. Id. at 30; BUREAU LAND MGMT., INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM NO. 2019014, OIL AND GAS BOND ADEQUACY REVIEWS (2018) [hereinafter BLM Memo
2018].
184. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM NO. 2013-151,
OIL AND GAS BOND ADEQUACY REVIEWS (2013).
185. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and
Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 16127, 16128 (citing 3104.5(b)).
186. Id.
187. BLM Memo 2018, supra note 183.
188. Pub. L. No. 94-258, 90 Stat. 303, 94th Cong. (Apr. 5, 1976), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6501–6508.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 6505a.
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protection” to areas with significant subsistence, recreational, fish and
wildlife, and historical values.190 Specifically designated areas—Special
Areas—include the Teshekpuk Lake and Utukok River Uplands,191 the
upper Colville River,192 the Kasegaluk Lagoon,193 and Peard Bay.194
Leases and permits must “include or provide for such conditions,
restrictions, and prohibitions as the Secretary deems necessary or
appropriate to mitigate reasonably foreseeable and significantly adverse
effects on the surface resources.”195
BLM has specific regulations governing oil and gas leases in NPRA
that provide for higher bonding amounts than for other BLM lands: 196
$100,000 per lease, or $300,000 NPRA-wide (the lessee may satisfy the
latter amount by raising its cheaper nationwide bond of $150,000 to
$300,000). There are no NPRA-specific regulations regarding DR&R
absent unitization,197 although stipulations for protecting surface resources
and special areas may be imposed at the time a surface use plan and permit
to drill are approved.198
BLM’s Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the 2012 plan for
NPRA indicated that the overall restoration goal after oil and gas
production ceases is to return the reserve to its previous condition and use,
190. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6504(a), 6506a(n)(2).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 6504; 43 C.F.R. § 2361.1; Bureau of Land Mgmt., 42 Fed.
Reg. 1 (Jan. 3, 1977).
192. 43 C.F.R. § 2361.1; Bureau of Land Mgmt., 42 Fed. Reg. 1 (Jan. 3, 1977).
193. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., NORTHWEST NATIONAL PETROLEUM
RESERVE-ALASKA INTEGRATED ACTIVITY PLAN/ ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, RECORD OF DECISION (2004); Bureau of Land Mgmt., Designation
of Addition to Special Areas in National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska, Kasegaluk
Lagoon, 70 Fed. Reg. 9096 (Feb. 24, 2005).
194. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., NATIONAL PETROLEUM RESERVE-ALASKA
INTEGRATED ACTIVITY PLAN/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, RECORD OF
DECISION (2013) [hereinafter NPRA ROD 2013].
195. 42 U.S.C. § 6506a(b). BLM’s regulations similarly indicate that BLM
should take any actions deemed “necessary to mitigate or avoid unnecessary
surface damage and to minimize ecological disturbance” and that BLM is
obligated to provide maximum protection measures for all areas identified as
having significant subsistence, recreational, fish and wildlife, or historical or
scenic values. 43 C.F.R. § 2361.1(a), (c).
196. 43 C.F.R. Part 3130.
197. See 43 C.F.R. § 3137.135 (within three months after unit termination, the
unit operator must submit to BLM for approval a plan and schedule for plugging
and abandonment and surface restoration operations; the unit operator must then
comply with the BLM-approved plan and schedule).
198. 43 C.F.R. § 3131.3.
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which largely concerns fish and wildlife habitat.199 Stipulation G-1 in the
Record of Decision for this plan requires the lessee, upon conclusion of
operations, to remove facilities and reclaim the land;200 however, the
Record of Decision allows for future projects in NPRA to deviate from
these standards.201 Thus far, BLM has opted not to impose any more
specific DR&R standards for NPRA developments.202 Further, the EIS
recognizes that NPRA may not be returned to its previous condition.203 For
example, gravel roads and pads could be left in place, which could
contribute to flooding and erosion204 and slow vegetation regrowth.205
4. Policies for the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
Unlike BLM, FWS does not have a multi-purpose mandate for land
management. Nationwide, FWS’s management mission under the
National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act is to conserve and
restore “the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within the
United States for the benefit of present and future generations of
Americans.”206 When considering if a particular use of a refuge should be
allowed, the FWS administrator must first determine whether the use
would be compatible with the overall purpose of conservation.207 As
discussed above, a number of Refuges allow seemingly incompatible oil
and gas development. This generally occurs where FWS has acquired
surface rights to Refuge lands without acquiring the underlying mineral
rights.208 BLM is responsible for administering oil and gas leases on
Refuge lands, using the same regulations applicable to BLM lands.209 Prior
NPRA EIS/IAP, supra note 16, at Vol. 77.
NPRA ROD 2013, supra note 194, at 67.
Id. at 44.
See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT FOR THE ALPINE SATELLITE DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR THE PROPOSED
GREATER MOOSES TOOTH ONE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT: RECORD OF DECISION
(2015); GMT2 ROD, supra note 159.
203. GMT2 ROD, supra note 159 at Vol. 2, 159. Lease Stipulation G-1 only
provides broad guidance for oil and gas field abandonment, requiring that the final
disposition of the land must meet the current and future needs of the public.
204. Id. at Vol. 2, 122.
205. Id. at Vol. 2, 132, 140.
206. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2).
207. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(3).
208. CRAFTON, COMAY & HUMPHRIES, supra note 26, at 2.
209. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 189; see also 50 C.F.R. § 29.31
(“Where mineral rights to lands in wildlife refuge areas are vested in the United States,
the provisions of 43 CFR 3101.3-3, 3109.4, 3201.1-6 and 3501.2-2 govern.”).
199.
200.
201.
202.
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to drilling or leasing, BLM is supposed to get concurrence from FWS “as
to the time, place and nature of such operations in order to give complete
protection to wildlife populations and wildlife habitat on the areas
leased.”210 FWS’s Refuge administration manual does not have specific
DR&R requirements,211 and no additional bond is required on top of what
BLM would require.212
In 2016, FWS issued regulations for non-federal oil and gas activity
in Refuges.213 The regulations exempted Refuges in Alaska, although the
performance-based standards may be used as guidance.214 Additionally,
FWS has not issued regulations specific to Alaska Refuges.
While Alaskan Refuges are subject to the National Wildlife Refuge
System Administration Act and other national acts, ANILCA modifies
management to some degree. ANILCA has a provision similar to the National
Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act requiring compatibility with
Refuge purposes.215 The Refuge purposes for ANWR are:
(i) to conserve fish and wildlife populations and habitats; (ii) to
fulfill the international treaty obligations of the United States with
respect to fish and wildlife and their habitats; (iii) to provide, in a
manner consistent with the purposes set forth above in (i) and (ii),
the opportunity for continued subsistence uses by local residents;
and (iv) to ensure, to the maximum extent practicable and in a
manner consistent with the purposes set forth in (i), water quality
and necessary water quantity win the refuge.216

210. 43 C.F.R. § 3101.5-1.
211. See Natural and Cultural Resources Management Part 612 Minerals
Management, 1.7(D)(3) (c, d), Fish & Wildlife Services (requiring operators to
“[r]emove structures and equipment from the area when they are no longer
needed” and “[w]hen operations end, restore the area as nearly as possible to its
condition prior to when operations began.”).
212. A previous version of this manual did require a bond. See Policy 612 FW
2, Oil and Gas, Part 2.9, Procedural Requirements for Permitting Oil and Gas
Activities, Subpart C, Performance Bond, Fish & Wildlife Services; see also FWS
2016 Rule at 79951.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Alaska National Investment Land Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L No.
96-487, § 304(b), 94 Stat. 2371 (“the Secretary may not permit any use, or grant
easements . . . unless such use (including but not limited to any oil and gas leasing
permitted under paragraph (2)) or purpose is compatible with the purposes of the
refuge.”).
216. Id. § 303(2).
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The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 added an additional purpose: “to
provide for an oil and gas program on the Coastal Plain.”217
The 2017 Tax Act directs the Interior Department to manage ANWR’s
oil and gas lease program “in a manner similar to how [BLM manages]
lease sales under the Naval Petroleum Reserve Production Act of 1976 []
(including regulations).”218 Theoretically, BLM should identify and
designate special areas with significant subsistence, recreational, fish and
wildlife, historical or scenic values, as it has done for NPRA, although it
has yet to do so. BLM regulations dating back to 1983 (prior to the first
round of ANWR exploration) provide that: “No lands within a refuge in
Alaska open to leasing shall be available until the Fish and Wildlife
Service has first completed compatability [sic] determinations.”219 To
date, FWS has not prepared a compatibility determination for leasing
ANWR.
In 2018, to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),220 BLM worked with FWS and other agencies to prepare a draft
environmental impact statement (EIS) for leasing ANWR.221 As discussed
above, BLM has interpreted the 2017 Tax Act in a manner that allows a
great deal of development to avoid the 2,000-acre development limit.222
The EIS contains general promises of restoration, but does not provide
strong Required Operating Procedures (ROPs) to ensure this restoration.
The objective of ROP 35 is to “[e]nsure ongoing and long-term
reclamation of land to its previous condition and use.”223 For Alternatives
B and C, the standard is the following:
Before final abandonment, land used for oil and gas
infrastructure—including well pads, production facilities, access
roads, and airstrips—would be reclaimed to ensure eventual
restoration of ecosystem function. The leaseholder would develop
and implement a BLM-approved abandonment and reclamation
plan. The plan would describe short-term stability, visual,
hydrological, and productivity objectives and steps to be taken to
ensure eventual ecosystem restoration to the land’s previous
hydrological, vegetation, and habitat condition. The BLM
217. 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97 (2017), § 20001(b)(2)(B) (amending
Section 303(2)(B) of ANILCA).
218. Id. § 20001(b)(3).
219. 43 C.F.R. §3101.5-3.
220. 42 U.S.C. § 4321–4347 (1970). 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–1518 (1970).
221. ANWR FEIS, supra note 111.
222. See supra Part II.D.
223. ANWR FEIS, supra note 111, at Vol. 1, 2-35.
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Authorized Officer may grant exceptions to satisfy stated
environmental or public purposes.224
The standard for Alternative D contains an additional requirement: “Oil
and gas infrastructure, including gravel pads, roads, airstrips, wells and
production facilities, would be removed and the land restored on an
ongoing basis, as extraction is complete.”225 ROP 24 addresses gravel
mining and reclamation of mining sites but contains no specific standards
on reclamation.226 As with ROP 35, BLM simply requires a plan for
restoration. But both of these ROPs, like the rest of the stipulations in this
document, may be waived at the discretion of the BLM Authorized
Officer.227 In short, the EIS is a missed opportunity to fill in gaps in DR&R
policies for Alaska Refuges.
B. State Laws Applicable Across the North Slope
The State of Alaska has generally taken the approach that DR&R
requirements can be addressed after oil production has already ended.228
Other than well plugging and abandonment regulations implemented by
AOGCC, there is little in the way of proactive DR&R policy. This Part
explains the laws and regulatory authority of state agencies that could
potentially apply to DR&R on the North Slope.
1. Oil Spill Policy
After the disastrous Exxon-Valdez oil spill in 1989, Alaska took steps
to better prevent and prepare for oil spills.229 But the focus was almost
entirely on spills in Alaskan waters—there is relatively little in place to
address onshore spills other than a reporting system.230
The Alaskan State Legislature has adopted a statute similar to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), administered by the Alaska Department of Environmental
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2-36.
226. Id. at 2-31.
227. Id. at 2-31, 2-36.
228. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-02-357, ALASKA’S
NORTH SLOPE, REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTORING LANDS AFTER OIL PRODUCTION
CEASES 79 (2002).
229. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.04.030 (2014).
230. Report a Spill, ALASKA DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, https://dec.
alaska.gov/spar/ppr/spill-information/reporting [https://perma.cc/HVG5-JDBN]
(last visited Sept. 8, 2019).
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Conservation, that makes owners and operators liable for “damages, for the
costs of response, containment, removal, or remedial action” resulting from
unpermitted release of hazardous substances.231 Unlike CERCLA,232 the
Alaskan statute’s definition of hazardous substances includes oil, associated
products and byproducts.233 The Alaska statute does not specifically address
DR&R and generally has been applied in the context of chemical releases
into water systems rather than oil field DR&R.234
2. Well Regulation by AOGCC
The Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission is a quasi-judicial
agency whose three commissioners are appointed by the governor and
confirmed by the legislature.235 AOGCC regulates P&A for wells across
Alaska, regardless of land ownership.236 AOGCC requirements aim to
prevent vertical movement of fluids in the wellbore and limit water
contamination.237 Operators must file annual reports regarding wells that
have been shut-in for more than a year.238 Wells generally must be plugged
and abandoned before the expiration of the lease,239 although an operator
can apply for and continually renew extensions to suspend closure if able
to demonstrate future utility and mechanical soundness.240 There are
minimal requirements for restoring the land around the well: within one
year of abandonment or at the end of the lease the operator generally must
remove all structures and fill in all pits.241
231. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (effective Jan. 15, 2019).
232. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1980); 40 C.F.R. §302.4 (2011).
233. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.826 (1986).
234. E.g., Flint Hills Res. Alaska, LLC v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc. 377
P.3d 959 (Alaska 2016); Berg v. Popham, 412 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2005). An
interesting use of the law is Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp. 991 P.2d 757
(Alaska 1999) (following Exxon-Valdez spill, municipalities who contributed to
cleanup alleged strict liability for discharge to recover compensation).
235. ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.005 (2006).
236. ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.027 (1980). BLM has not always submitted to this
jurisdiction; see Snow, supra note 82, at 23.
237. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 25.112 (2009).
238. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 25.115.
239. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 25.105(a).
240. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 25.110.
241. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 25.170 (2009). Current AOGCC
regulations do not fully cover land restoration. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20,
§ 25.047(b) (“Upon completion, suspension, or abandonment of the well, the
operator shall proceed with diligence to leave the reserve pit in a condition that
does not constitute a hazard to freshwater.”).
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Until recently, AOGCC’s bond levels were comparable with those of
BLM for NPRA: at least $100,000 for P&A for one well or at least
$200,000 for all the operator's wells in the state.242 These amounts are
inadequate for wells in remote locations on the North Slope that can cost
millions of dollars to permanently close.243 Commissioner Foerster herself
testified in 2017 that she was “not sure $200,000 would even pay for the
engineering study needed to plan the plugging operations, much less any
of the actual plugging costs.”244
In 2019, AOGCC was able to revise bond amounts as follows:
$400,000 per well for up to 10 wells; $6,000,000 for up to 40 wells;
$10,000,000 for up to 100 wells; $20,000,000 for up to 1,000 wells; and
$30,000,000 for any number of wells over 1,000.245 AOGCC may increase
or decrease these amounts based on evidence that engineering,
geotechnical, environmental, or location conditions warrant an
adjustment.246 Operators with existing bonds are not “grandfathered in,”
they must increase bond levels to the new amounts by 2022 with the option
of paying in installments.247 Bonds remain in effect until the wells have
been permanently plugged and abandoned and AOGCC approves final
clearance of the locations.248 AOGCC will not approve an operator’s
application for a permit to drill if the operator has not complied with these
requirements.249
The Alaska Oil and Gas Association strongly protested the revised
bonding regulations, urging Alaska to retain the same low and ineffective
bond levels as other states.250 AOGCC’s sister agency, the Alaska
242. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 25.025 (2018).
243. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-02-357, ALASKA’S
NORTH SLOPE, REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTORING LANDS AFTER OIL PRODUCTION
CEASES 6 (2002); Alex DeMarban, Hundreds of Unused Oil and Gas Wells Dot
Alaska. The State Wants Many Closed, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (June 12,
2017), https://www.adn.com/business- economy/energy/2017/06/12/alaskaregulators-plan-to-tackle-hundreds-of-unused-oil-and-gas-wells/
[https://perma.cc/6HCE-7NJJ].
244. Foerster, supra note 83; Ben Boettger, State Reduces Fine for NordAq
Wells, PENINSULA CLARION (July 2, 2018, 3:24 AM), https://www.peninsula
clarion.com/news/state-reduces-fine-for-nordaq-wells/ [https://perma.cc/9MWUSVAX].
245. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 25.025(b) (amended May 18, 2019).
246. Id.
247. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20§ 25.025(c).
248. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20§ 25.025(d).
249. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20§ 25.025(g).
250. Letter Re: Proposed Revisions to 20 AAC 25.025 – Bonding Regulations,
from Kara Moriarty, President & CEO, Alaska Oil and Gas Ass’n (AOGA), to
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Department of Natural Resources (ADNR) asked AOGCC to rescind the
regulations, calling them “unduly burdensome.”251 In the face of this
resistance, AOGCC’s actions are laudable. As suggested later in this
Article, however, there are additional steps AOGCC might take to ensure
adequate DR&R, including regulations addressing the area around wells.
C. Regulation of State Lands
ADNR is the state entity in charge of leasing state lands for oil and
gas development.252 Prior to exploration, ADNR generally must approve a
plan of operations that includes “plans for rehabilitation of the affected
leased or licensed area after completion of operations or phases of those
operations.”253 Before operations commence on a state oil and gas lease,
ADNR requires a DR&R bond for at least $10,000 per lease, or $500,000
for statewide activities.254
ADNR annually holds lease sales on state lands on the North Slope.
For these to take place, the ADNR commissioner must find that the sale is
in the best interest of the state.255 ADNR updates its “Best Interest
Findings” every ten years, consistently finding North Slope lease sales to
be in the best interest of the state.256 The DR&R standard for 2018, which
has been in place for at least ten years, is: “Upon abandonment of material
sites, drilling sites, roads, buildings or other facilities, such facilities must
be removed and the site rehabilitated to the satisfaction of the Director,
unless the Director and any non-state surface owner, determines that such
removal and rehabilitation is not in the state’s interest.”257
Comm’r Hollis French, Chair, Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n (Oct.16,
2018), https://www.aoga.org/sites/default/files/news/10_16_18_aoga_commenbts_
to_aogcc_on_2018_bonding_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH9C-TZT7] [hereinafter
AOGA].
251. Letter from Sara W. Longan, Deputy Comm’r, Dep’t of Nat. Res., to
Comm’rs Dan Seamount & Jessie Chmielowski, Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation
Comm’n (May 1, 2019) (on file with author).
252. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.131 (2018).
253. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 83.158 (2018).
254. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE § 83.160. Additional bonding may be required
under Alaska Administrative Code title 11, § 82.465, § 82.600, § 82.615, §
83.390, and § 96.060.
255. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.180(a)(2)(B) (2018).
256. See Best Interest Findings and Lease Sale, ALASKA DEP'T OF NAT.
RESOURCES DIVISION OF OIL & GAS, http://dog.dnr.alaska.gov/Services/BIF
AndLeaseSale [https://perma.cc/JY84-F2NE] (last visited Sept. 8, 2019).
257. ALASKA DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES DIVISION OF OIL & GAS, NORTH SLOPE
AREAWIDE OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES, WRITTEN FINDING OF THE DIRECTOR 9-3
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There are no criteria to determine if a site has been adequately
rehabilitated. In short, there is little in place to ensure that state lands will
be restored at the end of a lease.
D. North Slope Borough Laws
The North Slope Borough is a municipality nearly the size of the state
of Oregon, covering much of Arctic Alaska.258 As a “home rule borough,”
under the Alaskan Constitution, it has broad authority to impose DR&R
requirements so long as they do not directly conflict with state or federal
laws and federal law has not “occupied the field.”259 But the Borough has
done little to develop requirements and generally defers to the state in this
area of law.260 The Borough has been reluctant to require operators to
abandon facilities if there is a prospect of future development that could
contribute to the Borough’s property tax base.261 Decisions about DR&R
are generally not made until facilities are truly abandoned.262
The Borough’s land use ordinances governing DR&R have changed
little since the 1990s, although stipulations attached to leases have
strengthened over time. The Borough has the authority to require a DR&R
plan and a surety or bond of 100% of the potential costs of DR&R prior to
approving operations,263 but this is not generally done. Instead, the
Borough tends to require DR&R plans to be submitted 12 months after
operations have ceased.264 In summary, the North Slope Borough, like

(2018), https://dog.dnr.alaska.gov/Documents/Leasing/BestInterestFindings/2018
0418_NS_Final_BIF_Signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JAH-6KV6]. Essentially, the
same language appeared in the 2008 best interest findings. NSB, supra note 126.
258. Your Government, NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH, https://www.north-slope
.org/your-government https://perma.cc/8PJJ-UJAF (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
259. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; ALASKA CONST. art. X, §11 (“A home rule
borough or city may exercise all legislative powers not prohibited by law or by
charter.”); see also Walleri v. City of Fairbanks, 964 P.2d 463 (Alaska 1998);
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990) (setting forth the three-part
test for federal preemption; preemption can take place even when there is no direct
conflict if the federal law occupies the field or there is an implied conflict);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992).
260. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-02-357, ALASKA’S
NORTH SLOPE, REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTORING LANDS AFTER OIL PRODUCTION
CEASES 8 (2002).
261. NSB, supra note 126, at 135.
262. Id. at 141.
263. NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH, ALASKA, CODE § 19.30.070 (1990).
264. NSB, supra note 126, at 148.
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other entities with authority over North Slope drilling, does not have clear
requirements for DR&R.
Table 1 summarizes laws applicable to DR&R for the North Slope,
with BLM and AOGCC setting bonds for all wells, and BLM and ADNR
setting bonds for leases on lands they manage.265 The AOGCC’s bonds are
significant, though overall bonds are inadequate to fully compensate for
damage. Laws and guidance on restoration are so minimal as to be
practically meaningless. Given these policy conditions, it is unlikely that
developers of oil wells and infrastructure will adequately fund DR&R.
Elsewhere, this has resulted in state government and local communities
shouldering the responsibilities and costs of the process and/or litigating
for damages.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Part provides a range of suggestions to increase the likelihood
that North Slope lands will be restored after drilling has ceased. The first
Subpart describes what agencies could do with little to no policy change,
while the second Subpart offers policy recommendations based on other
jurisdictions. The recommendations here are just a summary of what might
be achievable; additional research and details are needed to develop
meaningful standards. While each circumstance is different and standards
may need to be adaptable, this Article argues that performance standards
should be imposed prior to drilling, rather than relying on the operator or
lessee to submit their own DR&R plan.
A. Improved Management Under Existing Law
1. Monitoring and Enforcement
This Article and reporting by GAO and others266 have demonstrated
the weaknesses in FWS and BLM’s system for tracking wells to ensure

265. See infra Appendix.
266. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-02-357, ALASKA’S
NORTH SLOPE, REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTORING LANDS AFTER OIL PRODUCTION
CEASES 3 (2002); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-517, NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGES, OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT AND
OVERSIGHT OF OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES ON FEDERAL LANDS (2003); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-292, OIL AND GAS BONDS, BLM NEEDS A
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO BETTER MANAGE POTENTIAL OIL AND GAS WELL
LIABILITY (2011).; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-250, OIL AND
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proper closure. There is a need for a nationwide database tracking the
number and location of wells for each operator within the United States,
the status of each well, and the history of violations and spills associated
with each operator. Within this system, a well should be classified as
“shut-in” or “temporarily abandoned” only for a limited time (for example,
two years) before the operator must properly plug and abandon the well
and restore the site.267 At the ground level, if drilling in acknowledged
ecologically unique or productive Special Areas and ANWR takes place,
there is a need to increase BLM and ANWR agency staff to monitor
activity and ensure compliance.268 Given the decades, and even centuries,
required for a landscape to recover, monitoring will need to be in place
indefinitely.269 While cases can be made that the dirty practices of the past
are just that, there is little recent evidence to support the conclusion that
well or field abandonment practices are or will be any different without
significant regulatory changes.
State government should also step up its enforcement, particularly in
terms of ADEC’s responsibility for addressing spills. ADEC has a robust
database of spills but has shown great reluctance to pursue monetary
compensation or legal action in regard to spills.
2. Bond Levels
Bond levels set by BLM and AOGCC can be adjusted on a case-bycase basis for various reasons, such as operator non-compliance.270
Agencies should exercise their authority to require higher bonds in
sensitive Arctic areas where risks are greater and restoration is more
difficult.

GAS WELLS, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS DATA AND
OVERSIGHT OF ITS POTENTIAL LIABILITIES 42 (2018).
267. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-250, OIL AND GAS WELLS,
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS DATA AND OVERSIGHT
OF ITS POTENTIAL LIABILITIES 42 (2018).
268. Two refuges in Louisiana have collected fees from operators to help pay
for staff. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-517, NATIONAL WILDLIFE
REFUGES, OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF
OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES ON FEDERAL LANDS 34 (2003).
269. See Riley, supra note 149.
270. 43 C.F.R. § 3104.5 (2011); 43 C.F.R. § 3106.6-2 (2011); 43 C.F.R. §
3106.7-1 (2011); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 25.025(b) (2019).
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3. Standards for ANWR Leasing
The current Required Operating Procedures (ROPs) 24 and 35 for
ANWR provided limited detail on DR&R and allowed for exemptions on
DR&R requirements. BLM has the authority to strengthen ROPs to
provide more specific land restoration policies, akin to those proposed in
the next Part. BLM should remove (or at least qualify) the provision that
allows it to grant exceptions to any DR&R requirements.
DR&R standards should better consider what the landscape will look
like once permafrost inevitably melts under disturbed areas. BLM should
require that permafrost core samples be taken at a site at sufficient
intervals to calculate the volume of massive and pore ice in the underlying
permafrost.271 There may be a need to leave a certain amount of gravel at
the site to maintain elevation.272 For the gravel that is removed, BLM
should specify where it will be placed to avoid the potential for
contamination.273
BLM should clarify how revegetation will take place in disturbed
areas (those where gravel has been placed as well as those impacted by
dust). Locally collected seeds of forbs and sedges or sprig with willows
are more likely to take root than grass seeds.274 Better still would be to
save and preserve the surface vegetative mat to use for rehabilitation.275
Additionally, BLM should clarify timelines for implementation of
DR&R, particularly if it is relying on a “rolling” 2,000-acre development
footprint that allows for new development as developed areas are
restored.276 There must be indicators (or at least a monitoring method) to
demonstrate that is site is fully rehabilitated before additional acreage
beyond the 2,000-acre limit can be developed.277
BLM should clearly explain what bonding requirements apply in
ANWR and why. New bonds should be filed by operators who have
already satisfied the national blanket bond requirement. BLM should

271. Conservation Comments on ANWR DEIS 2019, supra note 67, at 96.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 97.
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.29.13(D)(3) (2018) (“The division will
consider reclamation of all disturbed areas complete when uniform vegetative
cover has been established that reflects a life-form ratio of plus or minus fifty
percent of pre-disturbance levels and a total percent plant cover of at least seventy
percent of pre-disturbance levels, excluding noxious weeds.”).
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clarify that the bond must be furnished “prior to the issuance of an oil and
gas lease,” as required of lessees in NPRA.278
Finally, BLM should designate Special Areas in the Coastal Plain that
are off limits to leasing due to their particular ecological significance. To
the extent that BLM’s environmental review process fails to address these
inadequacies, FWS should do so in the compatibility determination
required by ANILCA and the 2017 Tax Act.279 Such a determination could
find the leasing compatible with ANWR purposes only if clear stipulations
for DR&R are imposed.
4. Cleanup of Abandoned Wells and Orphaned Sites
There remain a few legacy wells that have not been fully
remediated,280 as well as sites on the North Slope requiring additional
cleanup (including those not cleaned up through the BP Charter). Since
there may be no clearly responsible party for these wells and sites (other
than the government), Congress and the State of Alaska Legislature should
fund BLM and DNR (respectively) to conduct DR&R on remaining sites
and wells. Among the legacy wells in NPRA, 18 wells require additional
downhole P&A work.281 Near NPRA, there are five wells owned by Arctic
Slope Regional Corporation that may need additional work.282 Four wells
on the North Slope are on a watchlist, as AOGCC is not exactly sure where
they are.283 Finally, there are 15 wells on the North Slope with no
downhole casing that still need surface cleanup.284 Given the unlikelihood
of getting a Congressional or State legislative appropriation, entities such
as AOGCC or the North Slope Borough could consider imposing a small
fee to fund cleanup for existing and future orphan wells.285
278. 43 C.F.R. § 3134.1(a) (2018).
279. 43 C.F.R. § 3101.5-3 (2018).
280. See Opportunities for the Nation and States to Harness Onshore
Resources (ONSHORE) Act: Hearing on Discussion Draft of H.R. 4239 Before
the Subcomm. on Energy & Mineral Res. of the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 115th
Cong. (2017) (written statement of Cathy Foerster, Engineering Commissioner
and Chair, Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Commission).
281. Hughes, supra note 64.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. For example, the state of Michigan has an Orphan Well Program funded by
a severance tax on the oil and gas industry. On a monthly basis, each producer pays
5% (for gas) or 6.6% (for oil) of the gross cash market value of the total production
from the preceding month. Two percent of the severance tax revenue, but not less
than $1 million, is credited to the fund annually. See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§
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B. Proposed Policies
This Subpart proposes standards that agencies could adopt to ensure
DR&R. As indicated in footnotes, standards are based on
recommendations in the literature, onshore drilling requirements for
National Parks, Refuges in the Lower 48 States, and Canadian provinces,
as well as U.S. requirements for mining and offshore drilling.
1. Land Restoration
There is a need for clear landscape-level DR&R requirements prior to
development. Waiting until sites are abandoned to impose specific
requirements results in unrealistic expectations, since by this point the site
is no longer profitable and is potentially managed by a small operator, long
separated from the original developer.286 This is particularly problematic
for smaller companies that may not have funds available at the time
cleanup is needed.287
Policies applicable to the North Slope generally do not require DR&R
until the end of a lease. DR&R should begin when any part of development
infrastructure is no longer used and the operator cannot demonstrate the
potential for future use.288 The area should be restored in a manner
consistent with the habitat, ecosystem, and subsistence use of surrounding
205.301–205.303; Orphan Well Program Overview, MICH.GOV, https://www
.michigan.gov/egle/0,9429,7-135-3311_4231-112026--,00.html [https://perma.cc/
W5U5-83LA] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
286. NSB, supra note 126, at 150.
287. KOKS, supra note 29, at 16.
288. For oil and gas leases outside of Alaska, NPS requires “partial
reclamation of areas that are no longer necessary to conduct operations,” 50
C.F.R. § 29.117 (2016), and “[s]tructures and equipment must be removed when
the need for them has ended.” 50 C.F.R. § 29.32(a)(4) (2016). See also NSB,
supra note 126, at 159; N.M CODE R. § 19.15.29.13 (2018):
B. Areas reasonably needed for production operations or for subsequent
drilling operations must be compacted, covered, paved or otherwise
stabilized and maintained in such a way as to minimize dust and erosion
to the extent practical.
***
D. Reclamation of areas no longer in use. The responsible party shall
reclaim all areas disturbed by the remediation and closure, except areas
reasonably needed for production operations or for subsequent drilling
operations, as early and as nearly as practical to their original condition
or their final land use and maintain those areas to control dust and
minimize erosion to the extent practical.
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land areas, unless the authorizing entity determines that restoration would
cause greater adverse impact to the environment than leaving the area
unrestored, or there is a strong likelihood that the facilities will be re-used
in the near future.289
The likelihood of future use should be determined by either (1)
information provided by the operator or lessee demonstrating that future
use is more likely than not, based on development plans and oil prices; or
(2) consultation with local communities regarding their preferences, which
could be clarified in the form of a tribal or municipal resolution.
Restoration should involve returning the site to the approximate original
contour, restoring the hydrological flow, taking actions to prevent erosion
and the invasion of new species, and restoring native vegetation and soil
material.290
Gravel should be removed from the area unless it will serve as a base
for a future structure, is needed to level the ground, or will exacerbate the
existing damage.291 Any contaminated soil, as well as muds and cutting,
should also be removed. Exposed areas should be covered with sod if
available or seeded. Pits and trenched areas should be backfilled and
seeded.292 All wells should be permanently plugged and all platforms and
289. See NSB, supra note 126, at 159.
290. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 29.117 (2016) (FWS’s DR&R requirements for
refuges outside Alaska); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 62C-29.009(2)(d)(2) (1996):
The operator shall remove all waste, debris, and equipment and shall
restore the site as necessary to prevent erosion, invasion of exotic
species, interruption of sheetwater flow or other similar impacts. Land
drilling sites and access roads shall be restored to the approximate
original contour of the surface and revegetated with native vegetation.
See also N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.29.13 (2018):
A. The responsible party must substantially restore the impacted surface
areas to the condition that existed prior to the release or their final land
use. Restoration of the site must include the replacement of removed
material and must be replaced to the near original relative positions and
contoured to achieve erosion control, long-term stability and
preservation of surface water flow patterns.
***
C. The responsible party must construct the soil cover to the site’s
existing grade and prevent ponding of water and erosion of the cover
material.
291. See NSB, supra note 126, at 139 (“Rehabilitation efforts have been more
successful when gravel is removed to near-tundra level, and beginning in 2000,
removal of all or part of gravel from abandoned roads, pads and airstrips became
more common.”).
292. See id. at 140.
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other facilities must be removed within one year after a lease terminates
(if not removed earlier due to non-use), unless permission is received to
maintain a structure to conduct other activities.293 The lessee should have
to verify that the site has been restored within 60 days of well plugging or
platform removal by video or other means.294
Land managers (i.e., ADNR and BLM, and to some degree FWS) are
in the best position to issue and implement the above requirements for
leases and units, while AOGCC may be able to require some of these
measures for the area in the immediate vicinity of a well. The North Slope
Borough may also be able to impose some of these requirements as a
condition of approving an operator’s application to rezone lands reserved
for conservation to lands where development is allowed.295
2. Joint and Several Liability
Regulations governing offshore oil and gas operations provide for
joint and several liability, whereby each lessee of offshore oil and gas is
liable for all decommissioning obligations that accrue on the lease during
its ownership, including those that accrued prior to its ownership but had
not been performed.296 For example, if Company A sells its lease interest
to Company B, who in turn sells it to Company C, each of these companies
could be liable for the entire amount of damage associated with the lease,
regardless of when it occurred. There should be a similar provision for
onshore leases managed by BLM and ADNR.297

293. This is based on Bureau of Ocean and Energy Management regulations.
30 C.F.R. § 250.1710 (2011). C.F.R. § 250.1725 (2011).
294. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.1740.
295. NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH, ALASKA, CODE § 19.60.060 (2013) (showing
the procedure for rezoning).
296. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1701 (2011).
297. In many states, an intermediate assignee of an oil and gas lease may not
be liable for obligations that arose before or after assignment, unless the assignee
signed an agreement with the obligee or the obligee can enforce the assignment
agreement as a third-party beneficiary. 4 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M.
KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 403 (LexisNexis Matthew
Bender 2018).
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3. Financial Security
GAO recommended (and BLM concurred) that bonds should better
account for risks at the statewide and national level.298 Higher bond levels
may be needed for development in NPRA Special Areas and ANWR’s
Coastal Plain, given their ecological value, the high costs of transporting
fuel and materials to and from the sites, the likelihood that reclamation
will extend over multiple seasons since some reclamation may have to take
place during frozen conditions, and reduced productivity of people and
equipment in winter conditions.299 While some have made the argument
that it unfairly disadvantages small and emerging companies to have to
pay large bonds,300 it is perhaps more unfair to leave taxpayers with the
expense of cleaning up the mess created by an insolvent company. If BLM
is unwilling to pursue policy change, FWS could implement regulations
specifically addressing refuges in Alaska. These regulations could provide
additional bonding requirements on top of what BLM requires.
Rather than setting a flat bond rate per well, a standard formula should
be set that computes the bond for a particular well or set of wells based on
well depth and location, the number of wells, assets available for cleanup,
and the operator’s past non-compliance.301 A contingency factor should be
built into the cost of the bond to account for spills and unforeseen costs.302
An assessment could take place annually (like a property tax assessment)
or once every few years,303 since bonds lose value due to inflation and
298. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-250, OIL AND GAS WELLS,
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS DATA AND OVERSIGHT
OF ITS POTENTIAL LIABILITIES 43 (2018).
299. GOV’T OF N.W.T., CAN., RECLAIM 7.0 USER MANUAL, MINING
VERSION 3 (2017).
300. See AOGA, supra note 250.
301. See, e.g., ALTA. ENERGY REGULATOR, DIRECTIVE 011: LICENSEE
LIABILITY RATING (LLR) PROGRAM: UPDATED INDUSTRY PARAMETERS AND
LIABILITY COSTS (2015) (providing a formula); 36 C.F.R. § 9.141 (2016) (outside
of Alaska, NPS requires financial assurance in an amount equal to the estimated
cost of reclamation; it does not set minimum amounts).
302. See, e.g., GOV’T OF N.W.T., CAN, supra note 299, § 4.4.4, at 11 (“A
contingency is added to cover both the uncertainty in the costing estimate (i.e.,
variability in quantity of work, Unit Costs and required scope of activities) and
the possibility that some aspects of the closure and reclamation activities may be
more difficult to perform.”).
303. See, e.g., B.C. MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T, PROTOCOL 8 FOR
CONTAMINATED SITES § 8, at 10 (2007):
8.1. A Director shall carry out a review of the security for a site at least
every five years and no more than once per year.
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increasing cost of DR&R.304 The assessment could take into account the
financial wellbeing of a company and recent violations, and raise security
for companies with higher risk.305 The bond could increase as the scope of
activity is increased,306 and it could be adjusted for inflation.307 Bonds
could be reduced as reclamation is completed,308 but the agency should
retain some portion of the bond until all reclamation, including
revegetation, is complete.309
Similar to the systems for North Carolina and North Dakota, there
should not be a maximum bond that applies once a certain number of wells
are installed.310 While greater numbers of wells may allow lower marginal
8.2. A person providing security for a site shall be required to forward to
a Director annually a copy of his or her firm’s most recently audited
annual financial statements along with a copy of the firm’s signed annual
report.
8.3. For projects where costs are changing significantly, a Director shall
perform a security review more frequently than every five years. The
review shall include an analysis of the adjusted projected costs of the
project in relation to the actual costs incurred to date, and shall analyse
these costs in relation to the current value of the security provided.
304. See ARCADIS, supra note 29, at 3. (projecting DR&R costs to grow 540%
between 2015 and 2040).
305. An example is the British Columbia, Canada system, which increases
security if a company’s liability management rating (LMR) is less than 1.0. LMR is
calculated by dividing (deemed assets + security deposit) by (deemed liabilities). BC
OIL & GAS COMM’N, LIABILITY MANAGEMENT RATING PROGRAM MANUAL, Ver.
2.10, at 6 (2017). Another example is the National Park Service’s regulation, 36 C.F.R.
§ 9.142 (“The Regional Director may require, or you may request, an adjustment to
the financial assurance amount because of any circumstance that increases or
decreases the estimated costs established under § 9.141.”).
306. This is based on Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1259(e) (1977), 30 C.F.R. § 800.20(b). Another example concerns Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), which requires a lessee to maintain a
$50,000 lease bond or a $300,000 area-wide bond (which would cover all offshore
Alaska waters). See 30 C.F.R. § 556.900 (2018). Prior to exploration, the bond is
raised to $200,000 per lease or $1 million area-wide; and prior to production, the
bond is raised to $500,000 per lease or $3 million area-wide. 30 C.F.R. §556.901
(2018).
307. See, e.g., GOV’T OF N.W.T., CAN., supra note 299, § 4.6.1, at 13
(adjustments to mining financial security).
308. Id. § 3.2.2, at 4 (progressive reclamation considerations).
309. This is based on Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1259(b).
310. As mentioned above, neither North Carolina nor North Dakota have a
maximum limit for bonds.
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costs per well, each well abandonment will always impose an additional
cost.
In addition to the previously discussed weaknesses associated with
most bonding policies, another problem with bonds is the inability to
address contamination that emerges after the bond has been released.311
Legal commentators Dana and Wiseman proposed an alternative regime
to address some of the weaknesses of bonds: the regulatory agency could
require operators to purchase insurance for liabilities resulting from
inadequate DR&R.312 Insurance could be required in lieu of or in addition
to bond requirements, so as to protect against a worst-case scenario.313 As
indicated above, insurance is already allowed as an alternative to a bond
under current BLM regulations314 as well as for companies engaged in
offshore activity315 and for operators in Texas.316 Insurance could be
required at a federal, state, or local level. The North Slope Borough could
require insurance along the lines of what it has required commercial
recreation operators.317 To ensure adequate coverage, “self-insurance”
should not be allowed, although small insurers could be allowed to buy
coverage as a pool.318
One advantage of environmental liability insurance is that insurers
responsible for the ultimate costs may have more incentive than agencies

311. David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating
the Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and
Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1562–63 (2014).
312. Id.
313. For offshore drilling, in addition to bond requirements, BOEM requires any
applicant seeking to drill offshore to have “oil spill financial responsibility” insurance.
30 C.F.R. §553.11 (2018). The amount of insurance required is based on the volume
of the worst-case spill scenario. 30 C.F.R. § 553.13. Insurance must be maintained
continuously for all the applicant’s leases and permits. 30 C.F.R. §553.15.
314. See 43 C.F.R. § 3809.555 (2018).
315. See 33 U.S.C. § 2716 (2012); 33 C.F.R. §138.80 (2018); see also 30
C.F.R. § 585.526(a)(6) (2018) (insurance in lieu of a bond as a security for
offshore leases for renewable energy projects).
316. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.104 (West 2005); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.78(a)(11) (2016).
317. See NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH, FORM 200—COMMERCIAL RECREATION
PERMIT APPLICATION (2010), http://www.north-slope.org/ assets/images/uploads/
Form_200_Application_NSB_Commercial_Recreation_sept_2012.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/H9FG-JD6T].
318. See Dana & Wiseman, supra note 311, at 1581. Self-bonding is currently
not authorized by BLM and should not be authorized. See also 43 C.F.R. §
3809.555 (2018).

337577-LSU_EL_8-1.indd 207

1/3/20 7:23 AM

204

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. VIII

to gather information regarding exposure to risks.319 Also, insurers can
adapt more easily to changing circumstances by adopting new rules
outside of a regulatory process, and insurers are more insulated from
politics than regulators.320
CONCLUSION
While AOGCC has made great strides in matching bond levels to the
costs of DR&R in Arctic Alaska, regulations remain inadequate to ensure
restoration of sensitive landscapes impacted by oil and gas activity. BLM
could use the NEPA process to do much more to protect ANWR from
destructive impacts. To the extent BLM fails to do so, FWS should step
up and issue a compatibility determination for ANWR with stipulations
for DR&R. Assuming that BLM rewrites the plan for NPRA to open more
areas to leasing, this would be an opportunity to implement better
standards for DR&R.
There are few model jurisdictions in terms of DR&R and bonding
requirements, although there are examples of good policies within the U.S.
regimes for offshore drilling and mining and the regulations of some U.S.
states and Canadian provinces. Agencies responsible for oil and gas
activity on Arctic lands should consider policies that impose more tailored
and adjustable financial insurance requirements as well as more specific
DR&R standards, monitoring and enforcement of restoration effort, and
long-term monitoring of effectiveness. While BLM and FWS may be the
primary regulators for federal lands on the North Slope, the State of Alaska
and the North Slope Borough have significant power that could be used to
help ensure the long-term health and viability of these ecosystems and
mixed economies when the oil and gas has dried up. The Borough could
implement policies through zoning regulations, and AOGCC and ADEC
could exercise their statewide authority for controlling wells and spills.
Without such policies, junkyards on the North Slope will not be
limited to pockets like Service City. The Coastal Plain will be dotted with
abandoned wells and rotting buildings. Tundra where roads and building
pads are no longer needed will bear permanent scars from gravel
placement. Hydrology, wildlife, and ecosystem processes will be
irreparably altered. Existing bonds do not address these damages, and
without adequately addressing these damages, the costs of oil production
for new developments are vastly underestimated.

319. See Dana & Wiseman, supra note 311, at 1565.
320. Id. at 1568.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Summary of Key Agency DR&R Requirements Applicable
to the North Slope
Agencies

U.S.
Army
Corps/
EPA

Scope

All
wetlands
regardless of
ownership

Permitting
Requirements

Clean
Water
Act Sec.
404
Permit

Bonding
Requirements

None
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BLM

FWS

ADEC

AOGCC

ADNR

Federal
lands
managed
by BLM
and
drilling in
Refuges
FLPMA
and
NPRPA
regulations
control
leases and
permits

General
authority
over
Refuges

Hazardous
waste and
oil spills

All wells
regardless
of land
ownership

State
lands

None in
Alaska,
but
drilling
must be
compatible
with
Refuge
purpose
None in
Alaska

None
relevant

Regulations
require
permits for
well drilling

Leasing
requirements

None

$400,000
per well for
up to 10
wells;
$6,000,000
for up to 40
wells;
$10,000,000
for up to
100 wells;
$20,000,000
for up to
1000 wells,
and
$30,000,000
for any
number of
wells over
1000

$10,000
per lease,
or
$500,000
for statewide
activities

$100,000
per lease
in NPRA,
or
$300,000
NPRAwide
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Agencies

Restoration
Requirements
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BLM

FWS

ADEC

AOGCC

ADNR

P&A
requirement;
vague
general
requirement
in BLM
regulations
for
reclamation,
case-by-case
plan
requirement;
some
protections
for leases in
NPRA
Special
Areas;
NPRA 2012
ROD
general
stipulation
for
reclamation

None
in
Alaska

Spill
response
requirements

P&A
requirements
in immediate
vicinity of
well

General
lease
language
requiring
reclamation,
requirement
for
reclamation
plan
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